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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS IN AND FOR 
THE STATE OF UTAH 
IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF: 
LEONARD D. WATERS, 
Deceased. 
HELENA WATERS, personal 
representative of the Estate of Leonard D. 
Waters, 
Petitioner/Appellant, 
vs. 
DARLA JORGENSON, JEANNA 
SCOTT, BARBARA D. REYNOLDS, 
THEODORA ANN (TEDDI) BROWN, 
SHERRIE M. ALLAN, and FREDERICK 
L. WATERS, 
Respondents/Appellees. 
REPLY BRIEF 
OF APPELLANT 
Case No. 20000017-CA 
Petitioner/Appellant, Helena Waters, hereby submits this Reply Brief to the Brief of 
Respondents/Appellees, Darla Jorgenson, Jeanna Scott, Barbara D. Reynolds, Theodora Ann 
(Teddi) Brown, Sherrie M. Allan, and Frederick L. Waters. 
RESPONSE TO RESPONDENTS' STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The Statement of Facts contained in Petitioner's initial brief contains a complete and 
concise description of the facts of this case and the basis for the appeal. Respondents have 
accepted Petitioner's Statement of Facts as set forth in her initial brief "except where 
1 
specifically controverted herein". The word "herein" is not defined and there is no statement 
or list of controverted facts set forth in Respondents' brief, only allegations in the text of 
their arguments that are not in the record on appeal. There were not any evidentiary hearings 
nor any clearly defined findings of fact in the trial court record except as may be reflected 
in the interlocutory orders which are the subject of this appeal. Consequently, "facts" are 
limited to documentary exhibits in the record and the Orders of the trial court. 
The Respondents' "Statement of the Case" is a verbatim recitation from their 
Memorandum in Opposition to Petitioner's Motions (R. 131-136). Unfortunately, that 
memorandum also did not include a required statement of facts, and many of the 
representations made therein are inaccurate, incomplete, and, in some cases, false. There is 
no finding in the record which states that "at the time of his [Decedent's] death he held title 
in joint tenancy to a residence in Tooele, with his wife [Helena Waters]". There is no 
finding in the record which states that Decedent "had a pension with survivor benefits". The 
Honorable L. A. Dever did enter an Order approving the Nevada settlement in which the 
proceeds of that action were paid into the estate. (R.67-69). Respondents are in error in 
their assertion that a personal property allowance in the sum of $5,000.00 and a family 
allowance were denied by the District Court. The Court found in paragraph 4 of its Order 
dated March 16, 2000 (R. 219-221) that an evidentiary hearing would be necessary to 
determine the extent of any personal property allowance "conditioned on the value of the 
personal property of the estate". The Court also found that an evidentiary hearing was 
necessary on the question on whether a family allowance should be awarded to Petitioner as 
2 
Decedent's spouse. (R.220). Respondents have taken great license in their brief making 
representations of fact in the "Statement of the Case" that are not supported by the record. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
The arguments set forth herein are in specific response to four points made by 
Respondents in their brief. Although Respondents did not specifically respond in numerical 
order to the points set forth in Petitioner's brief, Petitioner will address in numerical order 
the points raised by Respondents. Petitioner will coalesce her arguments against 
Respondents' first two arguments into one because they are integrally related. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT WAS UNDER A CLEAR 
AND UNEQUIVOCAL DUTY TO ABIDE BY 
THE JUNE 22, 1999 ORDER OF JUDGE 
DEVER. 
Respondents argue that the Trial Court was under no duty to adhere to the June 22, 
1999 Interlocutory Order of Judge L.A. Dever. (R. 67-69). Before an examination of the 
case law regarding the "law of the case" doctrine by Respondents, they assert as fact the 
following allegations, which allegations are clearly false and can only be assumed to be 
designed to intentionally misrepresent the issues before this Court. 
First Respondents mischaracterize the language and intent of the stipulation of the 
parties to the Nevada action. (R.16-17, Exhibit "E"). The stipulation was entered into 
between the various plaintiffs to allow the net proceeds of the setdement to be paid to the 
Decedent's estate for administration pursuant to the Utah laws of descent and 
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distribution, not for a subsequent allocation to the various plaintiffs depending on the 
relative strengths of their positions under the original complaint. Second, the stipulation 
was not prepared by counsel for Petitioner, but was prepared by Bob Benton, the attorney 
for both Petitioner and Respondents in the Nevada action. Petitioner' s attorney in this action 
had no involvement whatsoever with the preparation of or the wording of the stipulation. 
Petitioner's attorney did not enter an appearance until April 26, 1999, nine days after the 
parties had apparently executed the stipulation and after he had been contacted by Bob 
Benton and Robert Hughes, Petitioner5 s original attorney for the estate and asked to represent 
Petitioner. (R. 12-13). The stipulations specifically state that the "net proceeds be paid to 
the estate of Leonard Waters, deceased, to be distributed by the estate now pending in Utah 
under Utah law of descent and distribution". (R. 16). 
Third, Respondents further allege in their Argument that the legal consequences of 
paying money into the estate in Utah was never explained to them. Please note the letter 
of Bob Benton dated April 13,1990 to his clients (R. 168-169), cited in Petitioner's original 
brief, but cited here again because of the Respondents' apparent refusal to acknowledge its 
existence. 
As I have explained to you all before, Mr. Waters' medical 
expenses exceeded $100,000 as a result of his injuries. The suit 
was brought for his personal injury. That claim survived his 
death and is being brought by the estate. Normally this 
character of a claim is an asset of the estate and is 
distributed under the laws of distribution of the state in 
which the deceased was a resident. In this case, of course, it 
is Utah. Please seek local counsel in this respect as I am not 
competent to advise as to the Utah law in this respect.... 
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Normally, this claim would require the testimony of the various 
surviving children and surviving widow as to the individual loss 
as to society, companionship, affection, as well as pecuniary 
loss. Obviously, Mrs. Waters has money loss. It is my 
understanding that none of the children lost money by virtue of 
Mr. Waters' demise. In this respect, there is a conflict of 
interest between my various clients. As a result I have 
requested all of you to seek independent legal representation 
when it comes to distribution of the limited proceeds being 
generated by this lawsuit. . . . 
I ask the surviving daughters to contact counsel and have the 
lawyer call me with reference to how to handle the 
distribution of this small net recovery. Jeanna called and 
indicated that the surviving daughters all got together and 
agreed that it should go into the estate and be distributed 
under Utah law of descent and distribution. I was hoping to 
get a letter from them confirming their agreement in this respect 
after having the opportunity to seek legal advice in this respect. 
(Emphasis added). (R. 168-169). 
Respondents further cite paragraph 9 of the June 22, 1999 Order (R. 67-69) for the 
position that the stipulation was only a "measure of convenience" without a determination 
as to how the settlement would eventually be distributed. Respondents choose to ignore the 
clear language of paragraph 8 of that Order, which states: 
8. Since the aforementioned settlement did not differentiate 
between the various claims of the estate and those of the 
individual plaintiffs, the plaintiffs stipulated and agreed that the 
net proceeds from the settlement of the aforementioned lawsuit 
shall be considered an asset of the decedent's estate and shall be 
distributed to the heirs of the decedent's estate according to the 
laws of the intestate succession for the State of Utah. (R.168-
169). 
Respondents seem to now assert that they were unaware that the Probate Code as adopted 
in Utah dealing in cases of intestate succession prioritizes certain payments of probate estate 
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assets prior to ultimate distribution to the heirs. Included in this prioritization are the 
payment of funeral expenses, estate administration expenses, statutory allowances, payment 
of claims, and other expenses fixed as to priority of payment by statute before any 
distribution is made to the surviving heirs. Utah Code Ann. §75-3-805 and §§75-2-401 
through 404 (pre-1998 law). 
The Respondents ignore the various cases cited by Petitioner in support of the "law 
of the case" doctrine as adopted in Utah. Instead, Respondents attempt to find sole support 
for their position in a misapplication of the holding in AMS Salt Industries, Inc. v. Mag. 
Corp. of America, 942 P.2d 315 (Utah 1997), a case also originally cited by Petitioner. In 
AMS Salt Industries, the Utah Supreme Court supported an exception to the "law of the 
case" doctrine where issues decided by the first judge were presented to the second judge in 
a "different light", specifically in that case where a summary judgment initially denied was 
subsequently granted after additional evidence was adduced. IdL at 319. There is no such 
situation in this case. There was no additional evidence adduced, only an apparent change 
of heart by the Respondents after petitions for statutory allowances were filed by Petitioner. 
Respondents argue that they were "trapped" by Petitioner who did not file petitions for 
homestead, exempt personal property, or family allowances prior to the filing of a petition 
for adjudication of intestacy and for approval of the Nevada settlement. However, the 
Respondents choose to ignore the fact that there were no assets in the probate estate to 
petition for the award of homestead, exempt personal property, or family allowances prior 
to the receipt of the Nevada settlement. Certainly, had Respondents consulted with counsel, 
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Respondents would have been advised of the existence of those allowances under Utah Law. 
Counsel would have also advised Respondents that the allowances were statutorily 
guaranteed to the surviving spouse, who has a legislatively-recognized closer relationship 
requiring monetary protection with a deceased spouse than the adult children of any previous 
marriage. Utah Code Ann. §75-2-102, §75-2-201 et seq.. and §75-2-401 et seq. (pre-1998 
law). 
Respondents further assert that Petitioner, who is also the personal representative of 
Decedent's estate, now claims that the money from the Nevada settlement is exclusively 
hers. No where in the record, the pleadings, petitions, motions, orders, or anywhere else has 
Petitioner made any such claim or assertion, and Respondents offer no citation to the record 
to support this claim. 
Finally, Respondents obfuscate the real issues by arguing that (1) Petitioner is not 
entitled to a claim for loss of marital consortium under Utah law; (2) Utah law limits 
wrongful death actions to a claim for the benefit of heirs; (3) interpleader is "the only thing 
that made sense . . . to compel conflicting complainants to litigate their claims among 
themselves"; and (4) again, Petitioner and her counsel drafted the stipulation between the 
parties to intentionally deceive them, which assertion explained earlier, is categorically false. 
The causes of action set forth in the Nevada action arose from an auto-pedestrian 
accident occurring in Nevada, involving a defendant who was a resident of Nevada and a 
vehicle that was registered in Nevada, and that was filed and Utigated in Nevada and settled 
under Nevada law. Whether or not Utah recognizes a claim for loss of marital consortium 
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is completely irrelevant. Utah's statutes relating to wrongful death are equally irrelevant. 
The assertion by Respondents on page 8 that because "the decedent was a resident of the 
State of Utah . . . [then he] certainly did not have sufficient contacts in Nevada to warrant 
the use of Nevada law under accepted principles of conflicts of law" is completely 
unsubstantiated. While Petitioner is not aware of any Utah decisions directly on point, there 
is ample authority in the decisions of neighboring states. In Lombardo v. Pollock 521 P.2d 
636, 637-8 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1974), the court found in a dispute as to the proceeds of a 
wrongful death settlement that damages received, whether by action, settlement or 
compromise, are to be distributed, apportioned or disposed of in accordance with provisions 
of the law of the state under whose statute the right to recovery accrued or the law of the 
place where the death-causing injury occurred rather than the law of the decedent's domicile. 
(A copy of Lombardo is attached at Appendix 7 to this Reply Brief). The same general rule 
applies in Washington, New Mexico, Kansas, and Oklahoma. See Johnson v. Spider Staging 
Corp., 555 P.2d 997, 1002 (Wash. 1976); First Nat. Bank v. Benson, 553 P.2d 1288, 1289 
(N.M. Ct. App. 1976) cert denied 558 P.2d 619; McDaniel v. Sinn, 400 P.2d 1018, 1021 
(Kansas 1965); and Cherokee Laboratories, Inc. v. Rogers. 398 P.2d 520, 524 (Okla. 1965). 
Furthermore, interpleader was not the appropriate remedy in this case to allow the 
Petitioner and Respondents to resolve competing claims. This is an action under the Utah 
Probate Code for the proper administration of a decedent's estate. It is a probate issue to 
determine whether or not statutory homestead and exempt personal property allowances are 
absolute. It does not involve questions of fact, but rather the application of law. While a 
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petition for a family allowance involves evidentiary issues and questions of fact as to the 
amount, if any, and the duration of such an allowance, the same is not true for homestead and 
exempt personal property allowances. It is also a function of probate to determine the 
amounts to be paid for funeral expenses, costs of administration, statutory allowances, and 
creditor claims, before any distribution to heirs. Neither the trial court nor the Respondents 
seem to grasp this fact. 
POINT II 
THE SURVIVING SPOUSE'S ENTITLEMENT 
TO A HOMESTEAD IS ABSOLUTE IN UTAH 
UNDER PRIOR LAW. 
Respondents argue that the agreement between the parties was "done on the 
assumption that all of the family members would take something thereunder". Otherwise, 
there would have been no agreement. There is absolutely nothing in the stipulation nor in 
correspondence between the parties supporting this position or contention. There were no 
discussions between the parties except through their mutual attorney, Bob Benton. There 
is not any affidavit by the Respondents in the record suggesting that they were misled or 
mistaken as to the effect of Utah law dealing with intestate succession. Instead, 
Respondents obfuscate the clear language of Utah Code Ann. § 75-2-401 (pre-1998 law) with 
the unrelated homestead exemption statute of Utah Code Ann. §78-3-3. Respondents then 
try to make an unsupported equitable argument that since Petitioner and the Decedent held 
a home in joint tenancy which the Petitioner acquired by operation of law upon the 
Decedent's death, that operation of law bars her claim to a homestead allowance. What 
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Respondents neglect to state is that said home was purchased many years prior to Decedent 's 
death solely with the assets of Petitioner and that over the years said home had been 
repeated^- ? ,r mid support: obli^alioik/i lo his 
prior wife. Consequently, Petitioner received v • eauitv i 
Decedent 's death since it had been used to satisfy his ongoing child support obligations. 
Hi ii. "I ci IIHIM' hi is a*. m,il ii i'the existence of a joint tenancy, are not in the record and 
should not, therefore, be consider 
Respondents finally argue thai to read the law as suggested by Petitioner is to 
entirely disinherit the rest of the family". That statement clearly demonstrates an ignorance 
of the Responds hdnml HK- I luilorni holiaU i "ode as adopted 
in Utah and in many other states. That intent was to protect the depend? 
and to provide a minimum "safety net" in the event of the death of a spouse or parent of 
11 Hi 11IH i / l l iM lV i 
That intent has been expressed e 
deciding former law, the Utah Supreme Court clearly stated that since the homestead 
allowance was a constitutional creation, all laws relating thereto were to be liberally 
constructed to fwoffil if In Kc Mower 's listau * * I, Jtah 
Supreme Court said the same thing in In Re Petersen's Estate, 93 P.2d 445, 11«' U tali 193 9) 
and further stated that "the amount of property owned by the person claiming homestead is 
not material to „!111vin inmn11nil »111 1 v v m ni • ill 11 i il momestead - . anowed". I d at 449 ('iting 
a former law (Section 101-4-6, R.S.U. 1933), the Court also stated i 
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no showing of dependence on a homestead and no reason appears why we should require 
such. Id 
The public policy consideration behind the homestead were incorporated into the 
Uniform Probate Code provisions originally enacted in Utah in 1975. The statute relating 
to homestead allowance has been amended several times, but those amendments are not 
germane or instructive to the issue before this Court. The jurisdictions of Idaho and 
Montana, having identical statutory provisions as Utah, have addressed the issue in a clear 
and unequivocal manner, and this Court should defer to their precedent. 
Respondents attempt to distinguish the Montana case of Matter of Estate of Merkei 
618 P.2d 872 (Mont. 1980) by suggesting the decision was somehow based upon prior 
Montana law which provided only for a "life estate" as a homestead. If that rationale were 
true, the Montana court would have reached the exact opposite decision. The finality of a 
fee allowance, whether in real property or in other assets including cash, flies in the face of 
an award of a "life estate" or other support of a temporary nature. The Idaho case of 
Simmons v. Ewing, 529 P. 2d 776 (Idaho 1974) is not even addressed in Respondent's brief. 
(Copies of both decisions are attached hereto at Appendix 8 to this Reply Brief). 
The Respondents then cite the Colorado case of In re Estate of Robbie J. Dodge. 685 
P.2d 260 (Colo. App. 1984) as supporting the proposition that a "homestead exemption" is 
outdated throwback to the Nineteenth Century and therefore should be disregarded. 
However, that court awarded a homestead to the decedent's minor children and reversed the 
trial court's awarding of a homestead to her estranged husband (and stepfather to the minor 
11 
children) who the decedent had evicted from her solely-owned home one month prior to her 
death. I he Respondents I ail lo mention that the Colorado statutes dealing with exempt 
|MM|K:it> iiiiiiiiiii mill ' itJiLL.i i i hl> \ i i I I in i n snj d umpi in n i t i t l i is attached as 
Appendix 9 to this Reply Brief) are dramatically different from IJtah * 
the Uniform Probate Code, C.RS § 15-11-403 provides for the payment of cash or other 
I'l'f'i |n;iifv | ill • cslak (o the surviving spouse of a value of fifteen thousand dollars 
($15,000.00) as allowances
 ; . A e m p t p e r s 0 I l a j 
property allowances under the pre-1998 laws between Utah, Idaho, and Montana, 
Respondents also cite Estate of Liccardo. 232 Cal.App.3d 962 (Cal App. 6 Dist. 1-
support loin ffini! pmpi siln ii  llli nil I ahl> law requires a homestead be in the form i 
estate only. However, Respondents fail to inform the G 
is substantially different from Utah law, and at the time Liccardo was decided, California law 
ill; to limited homestead allowances to a "life interest Liccardo primarily stands foi Ik 
proposition that any allow 
estate, and not from any separate property owned by the surviving spouse, which was what 
the Respondents asked the trial court to do if a homestead was warranted, fd at 966 
Finally, Respoi'dnil < Hi iVLitiei ul'hstaleol Wagley. ">0 P id lit., HH|H|,ili 1988) 
as support for their contention that Utah law bars "the award of a homestead allowance if 
there is not any real property in the probate estate. Respondents argue that because no 
liioiiiii, ?»lii*inl i II - HI in i I HIS i vii 11-quested in that case, "that absence of or failure to request 
an allowance constitutes binding authority ;md pn'siLKnr iirpumenl wliv h imrsU'Hd 
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allowance is not authorized in this case. Such is the inescapable conclusion Respondents 
demand this Court follow, and exemplifies the nature of their arguments throughout their 
brief. 
Petitioner submits that the arguments of Respondents are unsupported in law or in 
fact This Court is being asked to decide a case of first impression in Utah. Unfortunately, 
the decision may not have much impact beyond this case. Effective July 1, 1998, the Utah 
Legislature repealed Utah Code Ann. §§75-2-401 through 404 (pre-1998 law), and enacted 
a new §§75-2-401 through 405. (Copies of said statutes are attached at Appendix 10 to this 
Reply Brief). However, since the Decedent died before July 1,1998, the new statute is not 
applicable to this case. 
Under the statutes in effect in this case, a surviving spouse (of a decedent who died 
intestate leaving children from a prior marriage) divided the probate estate equally with those 
children after administration of the estate. Utah Code Ann. §75-2-102. Administration 
included payment of funeral bills, costs of administration, expenses of decedent's last illness, 
payment of statutory allowances, payment of priority and secured claims, and payment to 
general unsecured creditors. Utah Code Ann. §75-3-805 (pre-1998 law). The new statute 
relating to homestead allowance is rendered moot by the adoption of new Utah Code 
Ann. §75-2-402 (which replaced the old statute 401) and other changes in the Utah Probate 
Code). Utah Code Ann. §75-2-102 now provides that the surviving spouse of an intestate 
decedent shall receive the first $50,000.00 in any estate, plus one-half (Vi) of the balance, 
and incorporates the homestead and exempt personal property allowances therein as non-
13 
probate transfers as defined by Utah Code Ann. §75-2-206 (pre-1998 law) 1 hv I 'did 
Legislature has therefore resolved any future dispute as to the intent of the former Utah Code 
A l l , §§'7S-^ .|oi iliiihinifiji iuiMi n 1111 • I'i'Mhi iMwj by clearly manifesting an intention to initially 
pro vide a safety net of assets for the surviving spouse brio1" «in fJislnhilioi!' - Hlit1 liwr 
including adult children from a prior marriage, is made. 
POINT ffl 
PETITIONER IS ENTITLED TO AN EXEMPT 
PERSONAL PROPERTY ALT. OWANCE 
UNDER PRIOR LAW. 
Contrary to Respondent's contentions, Petitioner clearly addressed the issue of the 
t1 Mj"iiip( fifir'siiiiiiiiil |i> ii|ii iiiy" {ill i1 vi 'una1 n hei initial brief. Ihe family allowance issue is not 
an Issue on appeal. Without being redundant, tb* • *- - Manei of Estate 
ofWaglev has resolved the exempt personal property allowance issue in favor of Petitioner. 
I (1|||;1 (|| |ii;|| c o u r t c i e a r i y abused its discretion and erred as a matter of law is making such an 
allowance condition*' ' > \P » '" 'MilniM'n ,' IKMIIMI i , JrltTmrnc the extent and value of 
exempt personal property in which the Decedent had an interest 
CONCLUSION 
1 h r I mi ml in il I il in in nil n ilc* mi i ill ii in c d b e e e m b e i i i i l|! iiml March 16, 2000 are clearly in 
ereor, both in fact and in law. The Orders collective h »MIL * JM PI "ii|ustiu. ii|"» l^iitioiiei, 
who has been forced to expend limited estate resources to defend against the spurious claims 
of R espondeiiLs A hile some ambiguity may have existed as to the clear intent of former 
Utah Code Aim. 98 7 S - ? -401 thrr * was no ambiguity in the June 
22, 1999 Order of Judge Dever, nor is there any ambiguity in the clear intent of the Utah 
Legislature in the new modifications to the Utah Probate Code. This Court can and should 
consider subsequent changes of a law to determine legislative intent. Such was the position 
taken by the Arizona Supreme Court in Lombardo. 
It is not inappropriate for this court to look to subsequent 
changes of the law in support of its own views of the prior act 
. . .(citations omitted). As stated in the case of City of Mesa v. 
KillingsworflL 96 Arz. 290, 394 P.2d 410 (1964): 
. . . The Legislature has now clearly expressed its 
intention consistent with the construction which 
we believe should be placed on the former 
statutes. An amendment which, in effect, 
construes and clarifies a prior statute will be 
accepted as the legislative declaration of the 
original act. (Citations omitted). 
Lombardo at 639 citing City of Mesa at 414. 
Petitioner respectfully requests this Court to reverse the December 13, 1999 and 
March 16, 2000 Orders and remand this matter to the trial court with clear instructions to 
award Petitioner a statutorily-mandated homestead and exempt personal property allowance. 
DATED this 27th day of October, 2000. 
BARTHOLOMEW 
Petitioner 
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APPENDIX 7 
\ n z \pp 'ITT 
Shirlev LOMBARDO Petitioner 
v 
Elaine S POLLOCK as Guardian of the Es-
tate of L*»w-e-»_<j D Lombardo, a minor 
and Hon Ri nam N Roylston, a* j j dge 
of the Superior Court in and For the Coun-
ty of Pima Arizona, Respondents 
No 2 CA-CIV 1612 
Lourt of Aj^peils of Arizona, 
Division 2 
April 17 1974 
Rohe ir ing Denied May 22, 1974 
Review Denied June 11, 1974 
Pet i t ioner sought by special action to 
vaca te an o rde r dis t r ibut ing proceeds ot a 
wrongful dea th sett lement T h e Court of 
Appeals , H o w a r d J , held tha t statutorv 
provision requ i r ing distribution of wrong 
ful death proceeds according to laws of in 
tes tacy applies only when action is brought 
on behalf of estate, and that proceeds of 
set t lement made by deceased's wife on be 
half of herself and minor child in wrong 
ful death act ion w e r e to be distributed to 
wife and child in proport ion to their dam 
ages, r a the r than m equal p r o p o r t i o n 
Relief g r a n t e d , order vacated \s 
direct ions 
1 Death C^8 
T h e r e was no reason to look to law or 
Cal i fornia govern ing wrongful death to de 
te rmine dis t r ibut ion of proceeds of wrong 
ful death set t lement made in Arizona bv 
Cal ifornia beneficiaries where there was 
no conflict in result reached whether laws 
of Cal i fornia or Ar izona were applied 
2 Death <®==>8 
General ly damages recovered for 
wrongful death whether b> action settle 
ment or compromise are to be distributed 
appor t ioned or disposed of in accordance 
with provisions of law ot state under 
whose sta f *tfx n g h t fn ret overv accrued i 
e , ordinar i ly , the law of the place where 
the dea th causing mjurv occurred as dib 
t inguished i rom the law of decedent s dom 
lcile 
3 Statutes <§=205, 223.1 
In in te rpre t ing s ta tu tes and par ts of 
statutes, consistency is of pr ime impor 
utuce, courts must harmonize and recon-
cile laws and adopt construct ion which will 
achieve same 
4 Executors and Administrators <£=527l 
Intent of legislature in enact ing stat 
ute prohibit ing recovery in a wrongful 
death action from being subject to debts or 
liabilities of deceased unless action is 
brought on behalf of decedent 's estate was 
to give the part ies injured fair and mst 
damages resul t ing from tht. wrongful 
death A R S § 12-613 
5 Death <§=>I0I 
Statutory provision requir ing distnbu 
tion of wrongful death proceeds according 
to laws of intestacy applies only when ac 
t on is brought on behalf of estate A R S 
§ 12 612 [ C ] 
6 Death <§=>I0I 
Proceeds of sett lement made by de 
ceased's wife on behalf of herself and mi 
nor child in wrongful death action were to 
be distributed to wife and child in propor 
tion to their damages, ra ther than in equal 
proportions A R S § 12-612 [L] 
Miller, P i t t & Feldman, P C , by Stanley 
G Feldman, Tucson, for petitioner 
Browning, Druke & Hawkins , by Carol 
Wilson Druke , Tucson, for respondent 
guardian 
O P I N I O N 
H O W A R D , Judge 
A. superior court order distributing 
proceeds of a wrongful death settlemen 
the subject of this special action We 
of the opinion that , despite the existence 
t remedy by appeal, our obligation "to 
tnat essential just ice is done" warrant^ 
tervention by way ot special action 
Caruso v Super ior Court, 100 Ariz 
412 P 2d 463 (1966) 
The undisputed facts a r e as 
Peti t ioner is the surv iv ing spouse of L a w r 
ence Lombardo who died on F e b r u a r y 19 
1969 Lawrence D Lombardo , a minor is 
the only surviving child Decedent was a 
resident of and was domiciled m the Sta te 
of California, as were his spouse and child 
\t the time of his death, he was an em 
ployee of the Greyhound Bus Line but was 
present in the S ta te of Ar izona for the 
sole purpose of receiving medical t r ea tment 
at the Southern Pacific Memoria l Hospi ta l , 
having been refer red there from the 
Southern Pacific Employees ' Clinic in Los 
Angeles 
After her husband 's death, pet i t ioner (on 
Dehalf of herself and the minor child) filed 
a wrongful death action against Sou the rn 
Pacific Memorial Hospital I n c , and a 
Tucson doctor, al leging negligence on the 
part of the defendants The action was 
scheduled for t r ial in June , 1972, and on 
the day before trial pet i t ioner entered into 
a settlement agreement with the defendants 
whereby the defendants agreed to pay 
$215 000 m sett lement of all claims of all 
persons entitled to share in the recovery ot 
damages for the death of M r Lombardo 
Pursuant to court instruct ions and a p p r o \ 
al petitioner accepted the $215,000 in full 
ettlement of all claims and a hea r ing was 
onducted relative to distribution of said 
urn (Respondent Pollock was appointed 
uardian of the estate of the minor ) Pe 
r
 oner requested that the damages be dis 
iDuted m accordance with the actual loss 
stained by each of the beneficiaries enti 
i to share in the damage sett lement and 
at the court determine and divide the set 
ment proceeds in accordance with such 
tual loss 
Evidence was presented to the court as 
the actual loss sustained by each benefi 
tn support of her position petitioner relies 
n
 § 175 of the Restatement f *i
 L Law See Jil < onfi ts of Laws 
In an iction for a wrongful death the 
weal law of the state where the injury oe 
curred determines the rights md liabilities 
of
 the parties unless with respect to the par 
"cular issue some other state has the more 
^gmficant relationship under the principles 
w u. v i j i jwvxi , A r i z 6 3 7 
Cite as 521 P 2d 636 
follows ciary and at the conclusion of the hea r ing , 
the court found that the minor benef ic ia ry 
was damaged in the sum of $64,500 and 
the damages to the su rv iv ing spouse w e r e 
$150,500 The court , howeve r concluded 
that under A R S § 12-612(C) the set t le 
ment proceeds should be d is t r ibuted in ac 
cordance with the law of in tes ta te succe^ 
sion of California, the decedent ' s domicile 
Since under California law the personal es 
ta te of a person dying in tes ta te is d is t r ib 
uted one half to the su rv iv ing spouse and 
one half to the surv iv ing child, the cour t 
ordered petit ioner to d is t r ibute $107,500 to 
herself and $107 500 to the minor ' s gua rd i 
an 
Pet i t ioner contends tha t since unde r the 
California statute a wrongful dea th recov 
ery is not distr ibutable accord ing to the 
laws of intestate succession but r a t h e r ac 
cording to the pecuniary loss of each bene 
ficiary see C h a n g a n s \ Marve l , 231 Cal 
A p p 2 d 308, 41 C a l R p t r 774 (1964) In re 
Riccomi's Estate , 185 Cal 458, 197 P 97 
(1921), the subject dis t r ibut ion should also 
have been apport ioned accord ing to the re 
spective losses of the beneficiar ies which 
the lower court found to be 7 0 % - 3 0 % 
[1J Al though we agree wi th the peti 
t ioner as to the recovery rat io, we find no 
reason to look to the Cal ifornia wrongfu l 
death s tatute to determine dis t r ibut ion of 
the wrongful death proceeds 1 because 
there is no conflict between the result we 
reach and the result if the Cal i fornia stat 
utc were applied 
[2J I t is the general rule tha t damage 
recovered for wrongful death, w h e t h e r b> 
action, sett lement or compromise, a r e to be 
distributed apportioned, or disposed of in 
accordance with the provis ions of the law 
of the state under whose s ta tu te the r igh t 
stited in § 6 to the occurrence and the par 
fits n which event the local law of the other 
state will be applied 
Section 177 provides 
The more selected by application of the 
rule of § 175 determines how the recovery 
in an action for wrongful death shall be dis 
tributed ' 
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to recovery accrued, 1 e ordinarily the law 
of the place where the death causing mju 
ry occurred, as distinguished from the law 
of the decedent's domicile Cherokee Lab 
oratories, Inc v Rogers, 398 P 2d 520 
(Okll965), see Annot 92 A L R 2 d 1129 
A R S § 12-613 provides the measure of 
damages in an action for wrongful death 
" the jury shall give such dam 
ages as it deems fair and just with refer 
ence to the injury resulting from the death 
to the surviving parties who may be enti 
tied to recover, " This statute 
also protects the recovery from creditors' 
claims unless the wrongful death action is 
brought on behalf of the decedent's estate 
A R S § 12-612 as it read at the time of 
decedent's death, provides in pertinent 
part 
"A An action for wrongful death 
shall be brought by and in the name of 
the surviving husband or wife or person 
al representative of the deceased person 
for and on behalf of the surviving hus 
band or wife, children or parents, or if 
none of these survive, on behalf of the 
decedent's estate 
* * * * * * 
C The amount recovered in an ac 
tion for wrongful death shall be distrib 
uted to the parties provided for in 
subsection A and in the proportions pro 
vided by law for distribution of personal 
estate left by persons dying intestate" 
In Salinas v Kahn, 2 Ariz App 181, 407 
P2d 120 (1965), rehearing denied 2 Ariz 
App 348, 409 P2d 64 (1966)* we indicat 
ed that the provision regarding distribution 
according to the laws of intestacy is con 
trolling only when the action is brought 
for the benefit of the estate We stated 
' It seems to this court it may 
very well be argued that there is an ob 
vious inconsistency between the new pro 
visions for the assessment of damages 
[A R S § 12-613] and the old provisions 
for the distribution of damages and that 
the 1956 Act implicitly amended the old 
provisions for distribution in the case 
when designated beneficiaries survive" 
2 Ariz App at 194, 407 P2d at 133 
Arizona's first wrongful death statute 
was enacted lr 1887, Rev Stat Ariz §§ 
2145-2155, essentially following the format 
of Lord Campbell's Act To recover, it 
was necessary to allege and prove the exis 
tence of survivors and the amount of inju 
nes sustained by them Southern Pacific 
Company v Wilson, 10 Ariz 162, 85 P 
401 (1906) The Revised Statutes of 1901, 
Rev Stat Ariz Civ Code §§ 2764-2767, sub' 
stantially changed the nature of the earlier 
Act An action was created for the bene 
fit of the decedent's estate, and the dam 
ages recoverable were distributed as assets 
of the estate according to the laws of m 
testacy Southern Pacific Company v 
Wilson supra The 1901 Act was subse 
quently adopted with minor modifications 
in 1913 1928, and 1939 In 1956, the Act 
was changed and provided a right of re 
covery for the decedent's surviving spouse 
children or parents and if none survived 
recovery on behalf of the decedent's estate 
Although it provided for assessment of 
damages according to the loss sustained by 
the statutory beneficiaries, the old provi 
sion for distribution which was adopted in 
1901 when the action was for the benefit 
of the decedent's estate, remained 
[3-5] In interpreting statutes and parts 
of statutes consistency is of prime impor 
tance—courts must harmonize and recon 
cile laws and adopt the construction wind1 
will achieve this The intent of the legis 
lature in A R S § 12-613 was to give the 
parties injured fair and just damages re 
suiting from the wrongful death, as evi 
denced by the provision that such recovery 
shall not be subject to the debts or liabili-
ties of the deceased unless the action i£ 
brought on behalf of the decedent's estate 
We therefore hold that A R S § 12-6l2(<j3 
applies only when the action is brought 01 
behalf of the estate This is a common 
sense interpretation of legislative mtenl 
and harmonizes § 12-612(C) (1956) with 
„ denied Dy the Arizona Supreme Court February 16,1966 
2 Review was denied oy 
Cite as 521 
12-613, which provides that the damages to 
the injured parties 'shall be fair and just 
to the surviving parties who may 
be entitled to recovery " Otherwise, there 
could be parties who were not injured re 
ceiving damages when they sustained no 
pecuniary loss As was stated at 14 A L R 
p 522 
" If the purpose of the statute 
that the damages shall be assessed in 
view of the pecuniary loss to the individ 
uals is taken into consideration, it would 
seem that the reference to the statutes of 
distribution as the mode of determining 
the apportionment of the verdict should 
be construed as being merely for the 
purpose of ascertaining the classes of 
persons who may be entitled to partici 
pate, and the manner of distribution 
when not influenced by any considera 
tion of pecuniary loss to particular bene 
ficianes, and not as intending absolutely 
to control with regard to the amount 
each of the distributees shall receive 
when considered in connection with the 
pecuniary loss suffered by them 
We find nothing in Lueck v Superior 
Court, County of Cochise, 105 Ariz 583, 
469 P2d 68 (1970) which mandates a con 
trary holding3 In Lueck, the sole issue 
was whether parents of a decedent could 
recover when there also survived a wife 
and children The Court relied on Ian 
guage from the case of In Re Venneman's 
Estate, 286 Mich 368, 282 N W 180 
(1938) to the effect that the wisdom of a 
statute is not a matter for judicial consid 
eration but is wholly within the control of 
the legislature The Court then held that 
since parents would take nothing by mtes 
tate succession if a wife and children sur-
vive, parents had no right to recover m a 
wrongful death action 
3
 We recognize that there are statements in 
Lueck which are contrary to our holding in 
the case at bench, such statements are mere 
P 2d 636 
In 1973, the legislature amended A R S 
§ 12-612(C) to expressly state what we 
herein hold 
"C The amount recovered in an ac 
tion for wrongful death shall be distrib 
uted to the parties provided for m 
subsection A in proportion to their dam-
ages, and if recovery is on behalf of the 
decedent's estate the amount shall be an 
asset of the estate " 
It is not inappropriate for this court to 
look to subsequent changes of the law in 
support of its own views of the prior act 
General Petroleum Corporation of Califor-
nia v Smith, 62 Ariz 239, 157 P 2d 356 
(1945), Neil B McGumnis Equipment 
Company v Henson, 2 Ariz App 59, 406 
P2d 409 (1965) As stated in the case of 
City of Mesa v Kilhngsworth, 96 Ariz 
290, 394 P 2d 410 (1964) 
' The legislature has now 
clearly expressed its intention consistent 
with the construction which we believe 
should be placed on the former statutes 
An amendment which, in effect, con 
strues and clarifies a prior statute will 
be accepted as the legislative declaration 
of the original act [citation omitted]" 
96 Ariz at 297, 394 P 2d at 414 
[6] We hold, therefore, that the 
$215,000 is to be distributed to the petition-
er and the minor child in proportion to 
their damages, I e 70% to petitioner and 
30% to the guardian of the estate of the 
minor child 
The subject order of distribution is va 
cated with directions to enter an appropri-
ate order not inconsistent herewith 
HATHAWAY, C J , and KRUCKER, 
J , concur 
ly obiter dicta and not binding precedent 
Hernandez v County of Yuma 91 Ariz 35, 
369 P2d 271 (1962) 
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goes without saying that had the mother 
given advance notice, the father's visitation 
privileges could have been accordingly mod-
ified. But when the mother left without 
first getting the decree modified as to visi-
tation, she forced the father's hand. The 
only meaningful option he had was to force 
the issue by seeking a change in custody. 
Although he was not successful, he at least 
obtained a change in visitation to reflect 
the changed geographical distance between 
himself and his daughter. The trial court 
ordered that the father have custody for six 
weeks every summer, during alternate 
Christmas and Easter holidays and at other 
times convenient to the father and which 
would not interfere with the schooling or 
other activities of the child. 
[2,3] District courts have the means to 
compel compliance with their orders con-
cerning removal of children from the state. 
A trial court may assert continued power 
over domestic matters by requiring a bond 
conditioned upon a party's compliance with 
the court order. See Grimditch v. Grim-
ditch (1951), 71 Ariz. 237, 226 P.2d 142 (per-
mitting, under the facts, removal without 
bond); Wallace v. Wallace (1932), 92 Mont. 
489, 15 P.2d 915, 918 (security can be re-
quired to enforce an alimony decree). The 
trial court may also hold in contempt a 
parent who violates an order to secure court 
approval before removing a child from the 
state. Ex Parte Sellers (1948), 250 Ala. 87, 
33 So.2d 349; Benson v. Benson (1948), 121 
Mont. 439, 193 P.2d 827, 829 (dictum); see 
also Kramer v. Kramer (1978), 176 Mont. 
362, 578 P.2d 317, 318. We suggest that the 
trial court, in appropriate cases, employ 
these alternatives. 
[4] The mother contends that this ap-
peal is frivolous and asks us to assess a 
penalty against the father pursuant to Rule 
32, M.R.App.Civ.R, or, alternatively, to 
award her attorney fees pursuant to section 
40—4-110, MCA, because she cannot afford 
to pay her own attorney. She did not make 
this request at the trial level, and we are 
not inclined to act favorably on this request 
here. We cannot ignore the fact that it 
was the mother who moved to North Caroli-
na without first getting a change in the 
visitation privileges, and thus forced the 
father to initiate the present litigation. Es-
sentially, he had no other choice. Under 
the circumstances, the mother is not in an 
equitable position to argue that the father 
should pay her attorney fees. 
The order refusing to grant custody to 
the father is affirmed. 
HASWELL, C. J., and DALY, HARRI-
SON and SHEEHY, JJ., concur. 
O £ KEYNUMBERSYSTEM 
In the Matter of the ESTATE of 
Herman G. MERKEL, Deceased. 
No. 80-53. 
Supreme Court of Montana. 
Submitted Sept. 11, 1980. 
Decided Oct. 27, 1980. 
Personal representative of decedent's 
estate appealed from an order of the Dis-
trict Court, Eighteenth Judicial District, 
Gallatin County, Joseph Gary, J., which dis-
missed a petition for allowance of claims on 
behalf of the estate. 'The Supreme Court, 
Haswell, C. J., held that: (1) the statute 
which requires a showing of need in order 
for a protected spouse to claim an elective 
share in his or her late spouse's estate but 
which does not impose any such restriction 
on a competent spouse did not violate the 
equal protection clauses of the Federal or 
Montana Constitutions; (2) the sections 
which provide for a homestead allowance 
and exempt property contemplate estates in 
fee and not life estates only; and (3) by 
surviving her late husband for more than 
120 hours, widow and her estate became 
absolutely entitled to a fee interest in the 
homestead allowance and exempt property 
Affirmed in part, reversed in part and 
remanded. 
MATTER OF ESTATE OF MERKEL 
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1. Constitutional Law to 225.5 
Wills to 779 
Classification embodied in statute gov-
erning a surviving spouse's right of election, 
pursuant to which a competent spouse is 
not restricted in making the election while 
a protected spouse must show need before 
claiming the benefit of an election, did not 
involve a fundamental right or suspect class 
and, therefore, statute could survive equal 
protection challenge provided that the clas-
sification was reasonable and not arbitrary 
and rested on some difference having a fair 
and substantial relation to the statutory 
purpose. MCA 72-2-703; U.S.CA.Const. 
Amend. 14. 
2. Constitutional Law to 48(4) 
Party who alleges that a statutory clas-
sification violates equal protection has bur-
den to prove that the classification is arbi-
trary. U.S.CA.Const. Amend. 14. 
3. Wills «=> 779 
Primary purpose of the elective share 
statutes is to insure that a surviving 
spouse's needs are met and that the spouse 
is not left penniless. MCA 72-2-703. 
4. Constitutional Law to 225.5 
Wills to 779 
The statute which requires a showing 
of need in order for a protected spouse to 
claim an elective share against his or her 
deceased spouse's estate but which does not 
impose such requirement on a competent 
spouse was reasonable and not arbitrary 
when considered in light of the court's tra-
ditional role with respect to incompetent 
persons and of the statutory purpose to 
insure that surviving spouses' needs are met 
and, therefore, statute did not violate the 
equal protection clauses of the Federal or 
the Montana Constitutions. MCA 72-2-
703; Const. Art. 2, § 4; U.S.CA.Const. 
Amend. 14. 
5. Executors and Administrators to 173 
The primary purpose of the homestead 
allowance is to protect the decedent's fami-
ly. MCA 72-2-801, 72-2-802. 
6. Executors and Administrators to 180 
The statutes which create a homestead 
allowance and a surviving spouse's entitle-
ment to value not exceeding $3,500 from 
the deceased spouse's estate contemplate an 
interest which does not terminate at the 
surviving spouse's death, so long as the 
spouse survives the decedent for the re-
quired 120 hours. MCA 72-2-205, 72-2-
801, 72-2-802. 
7. Executors and Administrators «s=»174 
Where, though the statutes creating 
the homestead allowance and exempt prop-
erty continued the tradition of making stat-
utory rights available to a surviving spouse, 
the legislature chose not to identify either 
of these interests as life estates and where 
the former homestead provision explicitly 
indicated that the homestead was a life 
estate only, it was proper to assume that 
the legislature deliberately omitted the "life 
estate" limitation and the Supreme Court 
would not imply that limitation. MCA 72-
2-801, 72-2-802; R.CM.1947, § 91-2405 
(Repealed). 
8. Executors and Administrators <&=>181 
The statutory homestead allowance is 
no longer an interest just in land but is an 
allowance which may be satisfied in any 
type of property. MCA 72-2-801. 
9. Internal Revenue to 1008.1 
Legislative intent was that the home-
stead allowance and the exempt property 
allowance qualify for the marital deduction 
under federal estate tax law. MCA 7 2 - 1 -
102, 72-2-803; 26 U.S.CA. (I.R.C1954) 
§ 2056. 
10. Executors and Administrators <3=>180 
Where widow survived her husband for 
at least 120 hours, widow and her estate 
became absolutely entitled to a fee interest 
in the homestead allowance and in statuto-
rily exempt property. MCA 72-2-801, 72-
2-802. 
Steven D. Nelson argued, Bozeman, for 
appellant. 
Moore, Rice, O'Connell & Refling, Perry 
J. Moore argued, Bozeman, for respondent. 
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HASWELL, Chief Justice. 
The personal representative of the Estate 
of Celia J. Merkel appeals from an order 
entered in the District Court, Eighteenth 
Judicial District, dismissing a petition for 
allowance of claims on behalf of the estate 
of Celia J. Merkel. In his ruling, the dis-
trict judge denied the claims for the home-
stead allowance, exempt property, and an 
elective share. We affirm in part and re-
verse in part. 
The facts giving rise to this decision are 
important, particularly with respect to the 
time sequence involved. In 1967, Herman 
G. Merkel and Celia J. Merkel married, both 
of them over 70 years old at the time. In 
October 1977, Sterling Hunter was appoint-
ed guardian of Celia Merkel by a Montana 
court. Herman Merkel died in December 
1978, having executed a will earlier which 
left nothing to his wife Celia. On June 4, 
1979, Celia Merkel, through her guardian, 
filed a claim for exempt property and 
homestead allowance, and filed a petition 
for an elective share. Celia died 9 days 
later on June 13, 1979. 
On August 6, 1979, Sterling Hunter, the 
personal representative of the estate of Ce-
lia J. Merkel, filed a petition for allowance 
of the same claims on behalf of the estate 
of Celia Merkel. The personal representa-
tive of Herman Merkel's estate moved to 
dismiss the petition, asserting that Celia's 
failure to survive extinguished her claims, 
and that her estate had no valid claims. 
The district judge granted the motion, rul-
ing that the homestead allowance and ex-
empt property were life estates only. The 
district judge also denied Celia Merkel's 
petition for an elective share, because a 
court order had not been entered in which a 
finding was made that the election was 
necessary to support Celia Merkel as a pro-
tected person. 
The appellant brings two issues before 
this Court: 
(1) Whether section 72-2-703, MCA, re-
quiring a showing of need in order for a 
protected spouse to claim an elective share, 
is violative of the equal protection clauses 
of the United States Constitution and the 
Montana Constitution? 
(2) Whether sections 72-2-801 and 72-2-
802, MCA, providing for a homestead allow-
ance and exempt property, contemplate life 
estates only or rather estates in fee for 
which a surviving spouse's estate can bring 
claim? 
[1] Appellant's first contention is that 
section 72-2-703 is unconstitutional. That 
statute describes who may exercise the 
right of election: 
"Right of election personal to surviving 
spouse. The right of election of the sur-
viving spouse may be exercised only by 
him. In the case of a protected person, 
the right of election may be exercised 
only by order of the court in which pro-
tective proceedings as to his property are 
pending after finding that exercise is nec-
essary to provide adequate support for 
the protected person during his probable 
life expectancy." 
As the statute indicates, a competent 
spouse is not restricted in any way in mak-
ing the election, but a protected spouse has 
to pass the hurdle of showing need before 
claiming the possible benefits of an election. 
Clearly, the statute sets up a classifica-
tion-a classification which appellant con-
tends denies equal protection to protected 
spouses. 
The legislature is empowered to classify 
persons for purposes of legislation, State v. 
Craig (1976), 169 Mont. 150, 156, 545 P.2d 
649, 653, and in reviewing a statute, this 
Court presumes that the statute is constitu^ 
tional. Great Falls Nat. Bk. v. McCormid 
(1968), 152 Mont. 319, 323, 448 P.2d 991, 993! 
Appellant admits that this classification 
does not involve a "fundamental right" or a 
"suspect class", which would require a find-
ing by this Court of a compelling state 
interest in order to uphold the class. State 
v. Jack (1975), 167 Mont. 456, 461, 539 R2d 
726, 729. Rather, this Court need only .d | 
termine that the " 'classification [is] reason 
able, not arbitrary, and must rest upor 
some ground of difference having a fair anc 
substantial relation to the object of.itto 
legislation, so that all persons similarly cir 
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cumstanced shall be treated a l i k e . . . ' " 
State v. Craig, supra, 169 Mont, at 156, 545 
P.2d at 653. 
[2] The appellant has the burden of 
proving that the classification is arbitrary, 
State v. Jack, supra, 167 Mont, at 461, 539 
P.2d at 729, a burden which appellant has 
not sustained here. 
We note at the outset that the State 
legislatures have traditionally set apart the 
class which is involved here, delegating the 
care of incompetent persons to the State. 
The Colorado Supreme Court stated in the 
early case of Shapter v. Pillar (1900), 28 
Colo. 209, 63 P. 302, 304, "It falls to the 
State to take care of those who, by reason 
of mental incapacity, cannot take care of 
themselves." 
This tradition of delegating care of in-
competent persons to the State was the 
basis of a recent Colorado Supreme Court 
decision which upheld the constitutionality 
of the Colorado code section which corre-
sponds to section 72-2-703, MCA. See 
Sweeney v. Summers (1977), 194 Colo. 149, 
571 P.2d 1067. That court noted that the 
entire statutory scheme pertaining to in-
competent persons has placed their care ul-
timately with the State. Sweeney, supra, 
571 P.2d at 1069. See sections 72-5-401 et 
seq., MCA. Additionally, pre-Uniform Pro-
bate Code law in most states gave to a 
court of competent jurisdiction the respon-
sibility for making the decision of whether 
or not the incompetent spouse should elect 
against the decedent's will, 80 Am.Jur.2d 
Wills §§ 1614-1615, Annot., 3 A.L.R.3d 6, 
§ 3, a decision which was based primarily on 
the needs of the incompetent spouse. 
[3] The primary purpose of the elective 
share statutes is to insure that the surviv-
ing spouse's needs are met, and that the 
spouse is not left penniless. Annot, 3 A.L. 
R.3d 6, § 3. Presumably, in making the 
decision whether to elect or not, the compe-
tent spouse would consider many factors, 
with need being the most persuasive. Be-
cause of the statute in question, the court is 
required to make the election decision for 
the incompetent solely on the basis of need. 
Section 72-2-703, MCA. 
This statute clearly deprives the incompe-
tent spouse of a choice, and further de-
prives the incompetent of any excess prop-
erty to pass on to heirs, to invest, or to use 
for unnecessaries. However, providing 
funds for these purposes is not the primary 
aim of the statute and is merely an inciden-
tal benefit, available only if the decedent's 
estate happens to be large enough to allow 
these extras. 
By being subject to a protective order, 
the incompetent has already been deprived 
of the right to make choices in regard to 
property. Additionally, the court has be-
fore it, by virtue of the protective proceed-
ings, all of the information necessary to 
determine what is in the best interests of 
the protected spouse. The statute insures 
that the spouse will be adequately cared 
for, thus fulfilling the ultimate purpose of 
the statute, while denying the spouse only 
the discretionary income. 
[4] We find this statute to be reasonable 
and not arbitrary when considered in light 
of the traditional role of the court with 
respect to incompetent persons and when 
considered in light of the purpose of the 
statute. The district judge acted properly 
in denying the petition for an elective 
share. 
The second issue which appellant brings 
before this Court involves a determination 
of the nature of the interest created by the 
homestead allowance and exempt property 
statutes. Those statutes provide in part: 
"Homestead allowance. (1) A surviving 
spouse of a decedent who was domiciled 
in this state is entitled to a homestead 
allowance of $20,000. 
"(2) The homestead allowance is exempt 
from and has priority over all claims 
against the estate. 
"(3) Homestead allowance is in addition 
to any share passing to the surviving 
spouse or minor or dependent child by the 
will of the decedent unless otherwise pro-
vided, by intestate succession, or by way 
of elective share." Section 72-2-801, 
MCA. 
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"Exempt property. (1) In addition to the 
homestead allowance, the surviving 
spouse of a decedent who was domiciled 
in this state is entitled from the estate to 
value not exceeding $3,500. . . " Section 
72-2-802, MCA. 
Neither of the statutes indicates what 
type of interest is created, i. e., whether it is 
a fee interest in the surviving spouse, or a 
life estate only which is extinguished by the 
spouse's death. Celia Merkel attempted to 
claim these benefits as a surviving spouse, 
but she died before receiving them. Appel-
lant contends that Celia Merkel's estate is 
entitled to these benefits because she was a 
surviving spouse at the time she attempted 
to claim them. 
The courts of other states which have 
enacted the Uniform Probate Code (UPC) 
have not considered this question, nor do 
the Commission comments specifically ad-
dress this issue. Pre-code law in Montana 
indicates that the homestead was a life 
estate only. The purpose of the homestead 
was to preserve the fee interest for the 
heirs of the decedent, while setting aside a 
life estate, safe from creditors, for the 
spouse and family of the decedent. Kerlee 
v. Smith (1912), 46 Mont. 19, 22, 124 P. 777; 
40 Am.Jur.2d, Homestead, § 4. The early 
cases, however, were based on a Montana 
statute which specifically mandated that 
the homestead was a life estate, a statute 
that was repealed with the adoption of the 
UPC: 
" . . If the property set apart be a home-
stead, selected from the separate proper-
ty of the deceased, the court or judge can 
only set it apart for a limited period, to 
be designated in the order, which shall be 
a life estate to husband or wife, and the 
title vests in the heirs of the deceased, 
subject to such order." Section 91-2405, 
R.C.M.1947. (Emphasis added.) 
In determining that the two new inter-
ests created by the UPC were intended to 
be life estates, the district judge relied on 
this traditional view of the homestead, and 
on a 1960 Missouri case, interpreting the 
Missouri Homestead Allowance Statute (not 
UPC). See Schubel v. Bonacker (Mo.1960), 
331 S.W.2d 552. The Missouri court dis-
cussed the origins of the homestead, noting 
that neither the former homestead nor dow-
er survived the death of the surviving 
spouse. The object of the homestead to 
protect the family would not "be served by 
the payment of the homestead allowance to 
the estate of a surviving spouse." Schubel, 
331 S.W.2d at 554, supra. 
[5,6] This Court agrees with the district 
judge that the primary purpose of the 
homestead allowance and exempt property 
is to protect the family of the decedent. 
However, we find that sections 72-2-801 
and 72-2-802, MCA, giving these rights to 
a surviving spouse, contemplate an interest 
which does not terminate at the surviving 
spouse's death, so long as the spouse sur-
vives the decedent for the required 120 
hours, section 72-2-205, MCA. 
Appellant argues that the 120-hour pro-
vision in itself establishes a fee interest in a 
surviving spouse, and that by surviving 
Herman Merkel for nearly six months, Celia 
Merkel's estate was entitled to these bene-
fits. Section 72-2-205, MCA, provides in 
part: 
"Requirement that heir survive decedent 
by one hundred twenty hours. Any per-
son who fails to survive the decedent by 
120 hours is deemed to have predeceased 
the decedent for purposes of homestead 
allowance, exempt property, and intes-
tate succession, and the decedent's heirs 
are determined accordingly " 
Celia Merkel clearly qualifies as a surviv-
ing spouse under this statute, but this stat-
ute does not define the nature of the inter-
est created in the survivor, as to whether it 
is terminated upon the survivor's death. 
[7] Although the homestead allowance 
and exempt property continue the tradition 
of making statutory rights available to a 
surviving spouse, the Montana legislature 
chose not to identify either of these inter-
ests as life estates. Since this was explicit 
in the language of section 91-2405, R.C.M. 
1947, the former homestead provision, we 
assume that the legislature purposely omit-
ted the "life estate" limitation and we will 
MATTER OF ESTATE OF MERKEL 
Cite as, Mont., 618 P.2d 872 
Mont. 877 
not imply it. See C. Sands, Sutherland 
Statutory Construction, § 45.12 (4th ed. 
1972). In so construing the statute, we rely 
on the rule of statutory construction which 
provides: 
"[W]hen a statute is revised, some part 
being omitted, the omitted parts are not 
readily to be supplied by construction, but 
are ordinarily to be construed as an-
nulled." State v. Richardson (1953), 174 
Kan. 382, 256 P.2d 135, 139. 
The new statutes appear clear on their face. 
The respondent has not brought before the 
Court sufficient evidence to overcome the 
presumption that in passing new legislation, 
the legislature intended to make a change 
in existing law. Mont. Dept. of Rev. v. Am. 
Smelting & Refining (1977), 173 Mont. 316, 
325, 567 P.2d 901, 906. 
[8] The appellant raises other argu-
ments which indicate to this Court that the 
drafters of the UPC did not intend to limit 
these interests to life estates. The present 
homestead allowance is no longer an inter-
est just in land, but is an allowance which 
may be satisfied in any type of property. 
Terming these interests life estates would 
appear to undercut one of the expressed 
purposes of the UPC, that is "to simplify 
the law concerning the affairs of dece-
dents." Section 72-1-102, MCA. Court in-
volvement could drag on for years in order 
to insure the transfer of the property to the 
remaindermen, and the courts could be 
called upon to hear suits for waste against 
the life tenant. Too, with the possibility of 
satisfying the statutory allowance in money 
or personal property, the courts would be in 
a position of having to determine the use 
which a life tenant could make of the prop-
erty. See 51 Am.Jur.2d, Life Tenants, 
§§ 34-36. 
[9] One other point merits attention. 
The provision in the Uniform Probate Code 
providing for a Family allowance specifical-
ly states that "the death of any person 
entitled to family allowance terminates his 
right to allowances not yet paid." Section 
72-2-803, MCA. The comments to that 
section provide that " . the allowance 
provided by this section does not qualify for 
the marital deduction under the Federal 
Estate Tax Act because the interest is ter-
minable." This is the only statute in the 
"Family Protection" section of the UPC 
with such a provision. This omission im-
plies that the homestead allowance and ex-
empt property were meant to qualify for 
the marital deduction. If so, the interests 
created cannot be terminable interests. See 
section 2056, I.R.C. (1954). 
In 1979 the legislature of Nebraska added 
a provision to its version of the UPC in 
order to assure that the homestead allow-
ance and exempt property would qualify for 
the marital deduction. See § 30-2325, 
R.S.N. 1943, reissue of 1979, which provides 
in part that 
"[t]he homestead allowance, the exempt 
property shall vest in the surviving 
spouse as of the date of decedent's death, 
as a vested indefeasible right of property, 
shall survive as an asset of the surviving 
spouse's estate if unpaid on the death of 
such surviving spouse, and shall not ter-
minate upon the death or remarriage of 
the surviving spouse." 
[10] We find that such a provision is not 
necessary. It appears clear to us from the 
wording of the statute itself, as well as 
from the expressed purposes of the UPC, 
that the drafters intended that the surviv-
ing spouse should take a fee interest in the 
homestead allowance and exempt property. 
By surviving the decedent for 120 hours, 
Celia Merkel and her estate became entitled 
to those benefits absolutely. The district 
judge erred in denying those claims on be-
half of Celia Merkel's estate. 
This case is remanded to the District 
Court for entry of judgment in accordance 
with this opinion. 
DALY, HARRISON, 
SHEEHY, JJ , concur. 
SHEA and 
KEYNUMBERSYSTEM w5> 
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The question then becomes Does the 
record support the Industrial Commission's 
findings that Clay left his employment vol-
untarily without good cause? The In-
dustrial Commission made the following 
finding of fact in this regard 
FINDING OF FACT II 
" When he [Clay] was em-
ployed in 1971, he discussed with the em-
ployer the possibility of devoting some 
of his time to research and development 
at the employer's shop No specific 
agreement was reached, but the employer 
acknowledged the possibility that ar-
rangements could be made eventually so 
that the claimant could spend part of his 
time on research and continue to receive 
his regular salary " (Tr pp 
18-19) 
Based upon this and other findings of fact, 
the Industrial Commission made the fol 
lowing conclusion of law 
CONCLUSION OF LAW II 
" The claimant and the employ-
er never had a definite agreement to the 
effect that the claimant would eventually 
be allowed to do research and develop 
ment work [T]he failure to 
arrive at such an agreement did not con 
stitute a breach of the employment 
agreement by the employer, 
[and] the claimant's reason for leaving 
his employment was not of such a com-
pelling nature as to cause a reasonable 
person to voluntarily choose to become 
unemployed" (Tr p 20) 
[2, 3] This finding of fact and conclu 
sion of law cannot be upheld as supported 
by substantial, competent evidence if only 
Clay's live testimony before the commis-
sion is considered However, I C § 72-
1368(g) provides that when the commission 
is hearing appeals from the Department of 
Employment appeals examiner that "[t]he 
record of the proceedings before the ap-
peals examiner shall become part of the 
record of the proceedings before 
the board with respect to the evidence ad-
mitted into testimony received before the 
appeals examiner" And while this Court 
1S not bound by the view of the testimony 
taken by the Industrial Commission where 
they have not observed the witnesses them-
selves but are merely reviewing the record 
of the appeals examiner, Phipps v Boise 
Street Car Co , 61 Idaho 740, 107 P2d 148 
(1940), nevertheless, considering the testi-
mony given before the appeals examiner 
there is substantial, competent evidence to 
support both his conclusion that Clay had 
no specific agreement with Crooks about 
doing research and development work and 
thus left work without good cause, and the 
Industrial Commission's affirmance of the* 
appeals examiner's conclusion According 
ly where there is substantial evidence id 
support it, the finding of the Industrial 
Commission and the order based upon ft 
will not be disturbed on appeal Levesqu? 
v Hi Boy Meats, Inc , 95 Idaho 808, 52C 
P2d 549 (1974) *"l 
Order affirmed ^ 
SHEPARD, C J , and DONALDSONJ 
McQUADE and McFADDEN, JJ , concuB 
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Betty SIMMONS, Personal representative 
the Estate of Irene H Ewing, De 
ceased, Plaintiff-Appellant, 
v. 
Thomas G EWING, Surviving Spouse 
Defendant-Respondent 
No 11627 
bupreme Court of Idaho 
Dec 20, 1974 
Proceeding on personal repres< 
tives' application for informal p j 
The District Court, Second JudiaalJ 
trict, Nez Perce County, John H Max 
J entered orders which granted home 
and exempt property allowances to ft) 
OIMMUJNS v. EWING 
Cite as 529 p 2d 770 Idaho 777 
ing spouse from deceised's separate prop-
erty, and plaintiff appealed The Supreme 
Court, Donaldson, J , held that statutes in 
volved were not void for vagueness that 
awards did not defeat intention of testa 
trix, and that allowances were properly 
granted 
Affirmed 
I. Wills ©=782(10, 13) 
Grant of homestead and exempt prop-
erty allowances to surviving spouse from 
deceased's separate property was not objec 
tionable as defeating intentions of testatrix 
who executed will which was drafted with 
aid of an attorney after effective date of 
Uniform Probate Code but failed to in-
clude a clause in such manner as to require 
surviving spouse to elect between benefits 
of statutory allowances and whatever 
rights may accrue under provisions of will 
I C §§ 15-2-206(b), 15-2-401, 15-2-402 
2 Statutes <S==47 
Two sections of Code under which 
homestead and exempt property allowances 
were made were not invilid for vagueness 
and uncertainty because of dual use of 
"homestead" in Uniform Probate Code 
homestead allowance and homestead e\ 
emption from execution found in statutory 
scheme Const art 1, § 16 art 3, § 17 
I C §§ 15-2-401,55-1001 et seq 
3 Statutes €=47 
« Homestead allowance provision in 
Uniform Probate Code is not invalid for 
vagueness on ground that Code does not 
specify property from which allowance is 
to be taken first Const art 1, § 16 art 
3, § 17 I C §§ 15-2-401, 55-1001 et seq 
4 Executors and Administrators C=> 181 
. Under will which bequeathed all of de 
cedent's community property to surviving 
spouse, and only separate property re 
gained, separate property was sole source 
lor funds for homestead allowance to sur 
vivmg spouse Const art 1, § 16 art 3, 
§17, I C §§ 15-2-401, 55-1001 et seq 
5. Wills <£=58(2) 
jL A contract to make a will requires a 
Rowing of such by clear and convincing 
evidence 
529 P 2d—49Vz 
6 Constitutional Law <§=>I54(1) 
In the absence of clear and convincing 
evidence of contract to make a will, argu-
ment that Ijinform Probate Code impaired 
obligation of contract failed Const art 1, 
§ 16 art 3, § 17 I C §§ 15-2-401, 55-
1001 et seq 
7 W i l l s @=3| 
The right to dispose of property bv 
will is in no sense a property right or a 
so called natural right 
8 Appeal and Error <§=>756 
Appellant's failure to offer authority 
for position taken precluded Supreme 
Court from considering assignment of er-
ror Supreme Court Rules, rule 41 
9 Appeal and Error <@=»878(l) 
Issue not before Supreme Court by 
proper cross appeal would not be consid 
ered 
10 Executors and Administrators <S=> 181 
Exempt property and homestead allow 
ances were properly awarded to surviving 
spouse with funds for allowances being 
taken from deceased's separate property 
I C §§ 15-2-206(b), 15-2-401, 15-2-402, 
55-1001 et seq Const art 1 § 16 art 3, 
§ 17 
Joseph C Adams, J r , Lewiston, for 
plaintiff appellant 
Leslie T McCarthy, Lewiston, for de 
fendant respondent 
DONALDSON, Justice 
This appeal places in issue the propriety 
of exempt property and homestead allow 
ances being awarded by the district court 
to the surviving spouse, with funds for the 
allowances being taken from deceased's 
separate property Tor the reasons stated 
in this opinion, the orders of the district 
court are affirmed 
Irene H Ewing, the decedent, died Feb-
ruary 23, 1973, at which time she was dom 
lciled in Nez Perce County, Idaho She 
had executed a will dated January 24, 1973, 
in which she bequeathed her community 
property to her husband, Thomas G Ew 
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ing, the respondent, and her separate prop-
erty to her two daughters from a previous 
marriage, Donna Alexander and Betty 
Simmons Ms Simmons, whom the dece-
dent also nominated as Executrix, is the 
appellant in this action as personal repre-
sentative In that capacity she filed her 
application for informal probate on March 
7, 1973 
As a result of proceedings in the probate 
of the estate, the respondent was granted 
from decedent's separate property a $4,000 
homestead allowance (less $1,463 he had 
previously collected from a joint checking 
account) pursuant to I C § 15-2-401, and a 
$3,500 exempt property allowance pursuant 
to I C § 15-2-402 
This appeal is taken from those two or-
ders 
Appellant assigns the granting of the al-
lowances as error because such actions 
defeat the intentions of the testatrix Mrs 
Ewing, the appellant continues, intended 
that Mr Ewing receive only community 
property and that the daughters receive all 
of the deceased's separate property Thus, 
awarding Mr Ewing a portion of the sepa-
rate property defeats the intentions of the 
testatrix 
[1] The Court does not agree with the 
appellant as to Mrs Ewing's testamentary 
intentions While the language of the will 
may initially lead to such an interpretation, 
the entire testamentary scheme indicates 
otherwise Mrs Ewing executed the will, 
which was drafted with the aid of an at-
torney, after the Uniform Probate Code 
(hereinafter referred to as UPC) became 
effective in Idaho Under the provisions 
of the UPC the surviving spouse is entitled 
to both homestead and exempt property al 
lowances The UPC also has an election 
procedure wherein the testator may draft 
the will in such a manner as to require the 
surviving spouse to elect between the bene-
fits of the statutory allowances and what-
ever rights may accrue under the provi-
sions of the will I C § 15-2-206(b) The 
combination of the language of the docu-
ment and Mrs Ewing's failure to include 
an election clause in the will resulted in 
Mr Ewing receiving at least some of Mrs. 
Ewing's separate property As will be dis-
cussed below, the separate property was 
the only available source for funds for the 
allowances ? 
[2] A second assignment of error 
argues that the two sections of the Idaho 
Code under which the allowances were 
made are so vague and uncertain as to vio-
late the mandate of Article 3, Section 17 
of the Idaho Constitution That section 
provides that ' [e]very act or joint resolu-
tion shall be plainly worded, avoiding as 
far as practicable the use of technical 
terms " Appellant's argument focuses prL-! 
manly upon the dual use of "homestead" 
in the UPC homestead allowance and the 
homestead exemption from execution 
found in I C § 55-1001 et seq The Court 
finds no confusion in the duality The 
UPC provisions are effective only in the 
event the exemption homestead is not se 
lected The two statutory schemes are di 
rected toward the same end through differ 
ent means, and the brief intersection o3 
terminology can hardly be said to result n 
fatal ambiguity v 
[3,4] Appellant further argues tha 
vagueness is the result of the failure of the 
UPC to specify the property from whicl 
the allowance is to be taken first In this 
situation the statute is quite clear »T§ 
"homestead allowance is in addition to ygj 
share passing to the surviving spous 
* * * by the will of the decede| 
* * * " IC § 15-2-401 The will^bj 
queathed all decedent's community propert 
to the surviving spouse With only sepa 
rate property remaining, it is clear tna 
that is the sole source for funds for thely 
lowance Thus, the Court rejects appg 
lant's claims of unconstitutional vaguenjg 
See Nelson v Marshall, 94 Idaho 726,'gg 
P2d47(1972) ^ B 
[5-7] Appellant next argues t n a t J j | 
Uniform Probate Code impairs the oblig 
tion of a contract and therefore viola^ 
GARNER v. CRA1 
Cite as 52< 
Article 1, Section 16 of the Idaho Consti 
tution However appellant fails to instruct 
the Court on whether she is claiming that 
the will itself is a contractual obligation or 
whether there was a contract to make a 
will involved A contract to make a will 
requires a showing of such by clear and 
convincing evidence The appellant ad-
vances no evidence of such, and thus that 
argument fails Thomas v Thomas, 83 
Idaho 86, 357 P 2d 935 (1960) Second the 
appellant offers no authority to the point 
that the will itself constitutes a contract 
and we know of none Also, this Court 
has held that 'the right to dispose of prop-
erty by will is in 'no sense a property right 
or a so-called natural right' " l We do not 
agree with appellant's position 
[8] Finally, appellant argues that the 
granting of the allowances to the surviving 
spouse denied the other beneficiaries prop-
erty without due process of law This vio-
lates, appellant continues, Article 1, Sec 
tion 13 of the Idaho Constitution Due to 
appellant's failure to offer authority for 
this position, this Court will not consider 
the assignment Church v Roemer, 94 
Idaho 782, 498 P2d 1255 (1972) Su 
preme Court Rules, rule 41 
[9] Respondent attempts to assign as 
error the district court's disposition of a 
joint checking account held by the de 
ceased and the surviving spouse Since 
this issue is not before the Court by proper 
cross-appeal, the Court will not consider 
the issue Hemminger v Tn State Lum-
ber Company, 57 Idaho 697, 68 P 2d 54 
(1937) See also Leno v Northwest Cred 
t Corporation, 84 Idaho 364, 372 P 2d 765 
1962) 
[10] For the reasons stated herein, the 
)rders of the district court are affirmed 
~osts to respondent 
SHEPARD, C J , and McQUADE, 
BAKES and McFADDEN, JJ , concur 
ER FAKMS, INC Idaho 779 
P 2d 779 
96 Idaho 383 
Armi l M G A R N E R and Violet Garner, his 
wife, Plaintiffs-Appellants, 
v. 
C R A T E R F A R M S , I N C , an Idaho Corpora-
tion and Milestone, Inc , an Idaho Cor-
poration, Defendants-Respondents 
No 11331. 
Supieme Couit of Idaho 
Die 20 1974 
Husband and wife brought action for 
personal injuries sustained by wife while 
employed is operator of potato seed cut 
ting machine manufactured by defendant 
The District Court, Seventh Judicial Dis 
trict, Bingham County, Arnold T Beebe, 
J , granted manufacturer's motion for par 
tial summary judgment and plaintiff ap 
pealed The Supreme Court, Donaldson, 
J , held that questions of fact existed as to 
faulty design of the machine and contribu 
tory negligence 
Reversed and remanded 
i Products Liabi l i ty <§=>47 
Doctrine of strict liability was applica 
ble in suit for personal injuries sustained 
by employee while working as operator of 
high speed potato seed cutting machine 
manufactured by defendant 
2 Judgment C=>I8I(2) 
Summiry judgment is properly grant 
ed only when the pleadings, depositions, 
admissions, and affidavits on file show 
that there is no genuine issue as to any 
material fact Rules of Civil Procedure 
rule 56(c) 
3 Judgment C==>I85(2) 
In determining whether an issue of 
material fact is in dispute, facts should be 
liberally construed in favor of the party 
against whom summary judgment is 
sought Rules of Civil Procedure, rule 
56(c) 
Hull v Cartin, 61 Idaho 578, 597 105 P 2d 196, 205 (1940) (further citations omitted) 
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PART 4 
EXEMPT PROPERTY AND ALLOWANCES 
Cross references: For clarification of the term "surviving spouse", see § 15-11-802. 
15-11-401. Applicable law. This part 4 applies to the estate of a decedent who dies 
domiciled in this state. Rights to exempt property and a family allowance for a decedent 
who dies not domiciled in this state are governed by the law of the decedent's domicile at 
death. 
Source: L. 94: Entire part R&RE, p. 995, § 3, effective July 1,1995. L. 96: Entire section 
amended, p. 657, § 5, effective July 1. 
15-11-402. Homestead. The provisions of sections 38-41-201 and 38-41-204, C.R.S., pro-
vide for a homestead exemption but shall not create an allowance for the surviving spouse 
or minor children. A personal representative's obligation to distribute property as an 
exempt property allowance under section 15-11-403, to pay money as a family allowance 
under section 15-11-404, or to distribute property to devisees, heirs, or beneficiaries shall 
not be considered a debt, contract, or civil obligation, as referred to under sections 38-41-
201 and 38-41-202. C.R.S. 
Source: L. 94: Entire part R&RE, p. 995, § 3, effective July 1, 1995. 
15-11-403. Exempt property. The decedent's surviving spouse is entitled to exempt 
property from the estate in the form of cash in the amount of or other property of the estate 
in the value of fifteen thousand dollars in excess of any security interests therein. If there is 
no surviving spouse, the decedent's dependent children are entitled jointly to the same 
exempt property. Rights to exempt property have priority over all claims against the estate, 
except claims for the costs and expenses of administration, and reasonable funeral and bur-
ial, interment, or cremation expenses, which shall be paid in the priority and manner set 
forth in section 15-12-805. The right to exempt property shall abate as necessary to permit 
payment of the family allowance. These rights are in addition to any benefit or share pass-
ing to the surviving spouse or dependent children by the decedent's will, unless otherwise 
provided, by intestate succession, or by way of elective-share. 
Source: L. 94: Entire part R&RE, p. 995, § 3, effective July 1.1995. L. 96: Entire section 
amended, p. 657, § 6, effective July 1. 
Law reviews. For article, "Child Support 
Obligations After Death of the Supporting Par-
ent", see 16 Colo. Law. 790 (1987). For article, 
"Ownership of Personal Property Accumulated 
During a Marriage", see 17 Colo. Law. 623 
(1988). For article, "Avoiding Litigation in Pro-
bate Estates", see 18 Colo. Law. 875 (1989). 
Annotator's note: Since § 15-11-403 is similar 
to §§ 15-11-402 and 15-11-405 as they existed 
prior to the 1994 repeal and reenactment of this 
entire part, relevant cases construing those pro-
visions have been included in this section. For 
additional cases, see the annotations under for-
mer §§ 15-11-402 and 15-11-405 in the 1987 
replacement volume. 
This section and § 15-11-404 to be read with § 
15-11-202 (1). This section and § 15-11-404, pro-
viding for family and exempt property 
allowances, must be read in conjunction with the 
definition of "augmented estate" in § 15-11-202 
(1) to determine whether distributing such 
allowances from the "augmented estate" is con-
sistent and harmonious with the creation of an 
"augmented estate" under the statute. In re 
Estate of Novitt, 37 Colo. App. 524, 549 P.2d 805 
(1976). 
Allowances to be claimed from probate 
estate. The language of § 15-11-202 (1) clearly 
reflects a legislative intent to establish the fami-
ly allowance and exempt property allowance as 
items to be claimed from the probate estate, if 
any, to which are then added certain items to 
create the augmented estate. In re Estate of 
Novitt, 37 Colo. App. 524,549 P.2d 805 (1976). 
Medical services reimbursement funds not 
recoverable by treating physicians. Medical ser-
vices reimbursement funds received by the per-
sonal representative are a part of the surviving 
spouse's exempt property allowance when there 
exists no basis to impress a constructive trust on 
such funds. The legislature in enacting this sec-
tion clearly intended that a surviving spouse's 
exempt property allowance have priority over 
all claims against the state. Timothy C. Wirt, 
M.D.. PC. v. Prout. 754 P.2d 429 (Colo. App. 
1988). 
Source: L. 94: Entire part R&RE, p. 996. 
Am. Jur.2d. See 31 Am. Jur.2d, Executors and 
Administiators, § § 324-339. 
C.J.S. See 34 C.J.S., Executors and Adminis-
trators^ § 344-347. 
Law "reviews. For article, "The Widow's 
Allowance", see 6 Dicta 11 (April 1929). For 
article, "Widow's Allowance", see 25 Dicta 240 
(1948). For article, "A Decade of Coloiado Law-
Conflict ot Laws, Security, Contracts and Equi-
ty", see 23 Rocky Mt. L. Rev. 247 (1951). F01 
article, "'Child Support Obligations after Death 
of the Supporting Parent", see 16 Colo. Law. 790 
(1987). For article, "Ownership of Personal 
Property Accumulated During a Marriage"', see 
17 Colo Law. 623 (1988). For article, "Avoiding 
Litigation in Probate Estates", see 18 Colo Law 
875^ 1989). 
Annotator's note. The following annotations 
include cases decided under former provisions 
similar to this section. 
Section 15-11-403 and this section to be read 
with § 15-11-202 (1). Section 15-11-403 and this 
section, providing for family and exempt pioper-
ty allowances, must be read in conjunction with 
the definition ot "augmented estate" in § 15-11-
202 (1) to determine whether distiibuting such 
allowances from the "augmented estate" is con-
sistent and harmonious with the creation of an 
"augmented estate" under the statute. In re 
Estate of Novitt, 37 Colo. App. 524.549 P.2d 805 
(1976). 
This section is based upon sound public policy 
which the courts are zealous to effectuate. In re 
Bradley's Estate, 106 Colo. 500, 106 P.2d 1063 
(1940); Lyons v. Egan, 107 Colo. 32, 108 P.2d 873 
(1940). 
Applied in Lopata v. Met/el, 641 P2d 95 
(Colo. 1982); Snyder v. Macv, 674 P.2d 972 (Cole 
App. 1983). 
1 The purpose of this section is to secure su] 
port to the widow and children during the perk 
of administration, and the piolonged htigatic 
which sometimes ensues. Wilson v Wilson, : 
Colo 70, 132 P. 67 (1913); In re Bradley's Estat 
r 106 Colo. 500, 106 P.2d 1063 (1940); Lyons 
) Egan. 107 Colo 32,108 P.2d 873 (1940) 
The policy of providing a widow's allowanc 
is to protect the surviving spouse duiing tl 
i peiiod until a final distribution of the estate Cc 
1 be made In re Estate of Pla/za. 34 Colo. Ap 
J 296,526P.2d 155(1974). 
1 Rights in general. A widow may claim hi 
; allowance or waive it. She may take specif 
I items or cash. Until her position is made know 
or her right is terminated by limitation, proper 
of the estate cannot be disposed of and clair 
 against it can often not be settled Wiaington 
Wigington. 112 Colo. 78.145 P2d 980 (1944). 
A claim for a widow's allowance is a clai 
I against the estate of her deceased husban 
•> Bnmhle v Sickler, 83 Colo. 494. 266 P. 4' 
(1928); Hale v. Burford, 73 Colo 197. 214 P 5 
I (1923); In re Williams' Estate, 101 Colo. 262, 
P2d 476 (1937); In re Elam's Estate, 104 Co 
i 126, 89 P.2d 243 (1939) 
The allowance is a part of the expense of t 
i administration of an estate. Hale v. Burford, 
t Colo. 197, 214 P. 543 (1923); Ahlf v King, 
5 Colo. 425, 298 P. 647 (1931); Deeble v. Alertc 
58 Colo. 166,143 P. 1096 (1914). 
) Allowances to be claimed from probi 
: estate. The language of § 15-11-202 (1) clea 
 reflects a legislative intent to establish the far 
 ly allowance and exempt property allowance 
items to be claimed from the probate estate 
15-11-404. Family allowance. (1) In addition to the right to exempt property, th 
decedent's surviving spouse and minor children who the decedent was obligated to suppoi 
and children who were in fact being supported by the decedent are entitled to a reasonabl 
allowance in money out of the estate for their maintenance during the period of adminis 
tration, which allowance may not continue for longer than one year if the estate is inade 
quate to discharge allowed claims. The allowance may be paid as a lump sum or in period 
ic installments. It is payable to the surviving spouse, if living, for the use of the survivin 
spouse and minor and dependent children; otherwise to the children, or persons havin 
their care and custody. If a minor child or dependent child is not living with the survivin 
spouse, the allowance may be made partially to the child or his or her guardian or othe 
person having the child's care and custody, and partially to the spouse, as their needs ma 
appear. The family allowance is exempt from and has priority over all claims except claim 
for the costs and expenses of administration, and reasonable funeral and burial, intermen 
or cremation expenses, which shall be paid in the priority and manner set forth in sectio 
15-12-805. 
(2) The family allowance is not chargeable against any benefit or share passing to th 
surviving spouse or children by the will of the decedent, unless otherwise provided, b 
intestate succession, or by way of elective-share. The death of any person entitled to a fan 
ily allowance terminates the right to receive an allowance for any period arising after his c 
her death, but does not affect the right of his or her estate to recover the unpaid allowanc 
for periods prior to his or her death. 
§ 3, effective July 1.1995. 
APPENDIX 10 
5-2-401 UNIFORM PROBATE CODE 
ot named in will was not intentional, where 
ontrary fact did not appear In re Atwood's 
Istate, 14 Utah 1, 45 P 1036, 60 Am St R 
78 (1896), overruled on other grounds, In re 
/tiller's Estate, 31 Utah 415, 88 P 338 (1906) 
An instruction was not to be so worded as to 
History: C. 1953, 75-2-401, enacted by L. 
1983, ch. 226, § 2; 1988, ch. 110, § 3. 
Repeals and Reenactments. — Laws 1977, 
ch 194, § 10 repealed former § 75-2 401 (L 
1975, ch 150, § 3), relating to homestead al-
lowance, and enacted a new § 75 2 401 
Laws 1983, ch 226, § 2 repealed former 
§ 75-2-401 (L 1977, ch 194, § 10), relating to 
the homestead, and enacted the above section 
Editorial Board Comment. — See 
§ 75 2-803 for the definition of "spouse" which 
controls in this part Also, see § 75-2-104 
Waiver of homestead is covered by § 75-2-204 
"Election" between the provision of a will and 
homestead is covered by § 75-2-206 
A set dollar amount for homestead allowance 
[see § 78-23-31 was dictated by the desirability 
of having a certain level below which adminis-
tration may be dispensed with or be handled 
summarily, without regard to the size of allow-
ances under § 75-2-402 The "small estate" 
convey to the jury the thought that the pre-
sumption of unintentional omission was itself 
evidence, such a charge was prejudicial and er-
roneous In re Newell's Estate, 78 Utah 463, 5 
P 2d 230 (1931) 
line is controlled largely, though not entirely, 
by the size of the homestead allowance This is 
because Part 12 of Chapter 3 dealing with 
small estates rests on the assumption that the 
only justification for keeping a decedent's as-
sets from his creditors is to benefit the dece-
dent's spouse and children 
Another reason for a set amount is related to 
the fact that homestead allowance may prefer 
a decedent's minor or dependent children over 
his other children It was felt desirable to mini-
mize the consequence of application of an arbi-
trary age line among children of the testator 
Cross-References. — Homestead exemp-
tion, Utah Const, Art XXII, Sec 1, 
§§ 78-23-3, 78-23-4, exemption from execution, 
§ 78-23-5 et seq 
Partition proceedings, § 78-39-1 et seq 
Spouse, effect of divorce, annulment or sepa-
ration, § 75-2-803 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 79 Am Ju r 2d Wills § 644 to, or evidence of contemplation of, heir to ren-
C.J.S. — 96 C J S Wills § 718 der statute inapplicable, 83 A L R 4 t h 779. 
A.L.R. — Pretermitted heir statutes what Key Numbers. — Wills «=» 82 
constitutes sufficient testamentary reference 
PART 4 
EXEMPT PROPERTY AND ALLOWANCES 
75-2-401. Homestead allowance — Amount. 
A surviving spouse of a decedent who was domiciled in this state is entitled 
to a homestead allowance of $10,000. If there is no surviving spouse, each 
minor child and each dependent child of the decedent is entitled to a home-
stead allowance amounting to $10,000 divided by the number of minor and 
dependent children of the decedent The homestead allowance is exempt from, 
and has priority over, all claims against the estate, except claims for reason-
able funeral expenses and expenses of administration The homestead allow-
ance is in addition to any share passing to the surviving spouse or minor or 
dependent child by intestate succession, but is chargeable against any share 
passing by the will of the decedent, unless the will provides otherwise 
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NOTES TO 
ANALYSIS 
Constitutionality 
Admi nistration 
Children 
Construction and application 
Exemption from payment of debts. 
Right to dispose of homestead 
Right to homestead 
C constitutionality. 
Constitutional provision setting up equality 
of rights of ownership of separate property by 
married woman, and eliminating the common-
law incapacity, did not confer rights upon 
wives different from those of husbands, and did 
not invalidate statute giving husband home-
stead in property of deceased wife In re 
Petersen's Estate, 97 Utah 324, 93 P 2d 445 
(1939) 
Administration. 
Contention of widow that legal right of ad-
ministrator could not be enforced because 
there were no debts and value of the property 
would not exceed the exemptions to which she 
was entitled under former provisions was with-
out merit Columbia Trust Co v Anglum, 63 
Utah 353, 225 P 1089 (1924) 
It was not a valid objection to a claim of 
homestead that the parties had not resided on 
the property, or that the property was held in 
cotenancy with a stranger In re Petersen's Es-
tate, 97 Utah 324, 93 P 2d 445 (1939) 
The amount of property owned by the person 
claiming homestead was not material to a de 
termination of whether homestead should be 
allowed In re Petersen's Estate, 97 Utah 324, 
93 P 2d 445 (1939) 
Children. 
"Children" was used in homestead provisions 
of former succession statutes in its common 
sense In re Walton's Estate, 115 Utah 160, 203 
P 2d 393 (1949) 
Construction and application. 
Homestead being constitutional creation, all 
laws relating thereto were to be liberally con-
strued to protect it and make it effective for 
dependent and helpless, to ensure them shelter 
and support In re Mower's Estate, 93 Utah 
390, 73 P 2d 967 (1937), In re Petersen's Es-
tate, 97 Utah 324, 93 P 2d 445 (1939) 
COLLATERAL 
Utah Law Review. — Exemptions from 
Utah's Estate Tax, 1970 Utah L Rev 42 
Brigham Young Law Review. — Articles 
II and III of the Uniform Probate Code as En 
acted in Utah, 1976 B Y U L Rev 425 
DECISIONS 
Exemption from payment of debts. 
Reasonable expenses of decedent's last ill-
ness and funeral expenses as well as adminis-
tration expenses were preferred claims against 
estate, and when necessary, homestead prop-
erty was subject to their payment In re 
Thorn's Estate, 24 Utah 209, 67 P 22 (1901), 
In re Petersen's Estate, 69 Utah 484, 256 P 
409 (1927), In re Mower's Estate, 93 Utah 390, 
73 P 2d 967 (1937) 
Right to dispose of homestead. 
Under former statute, right to dispose of 
homestead property by will was limited to such 
estates as exceeded homestead limit in value 
In re Little, 22 Utah 204, 61 P 899 (1900) 
Under former provisions husband could dis-
pose of all his estate by will subject to home-
stead rights of widow and minor children, if 
wife's one-third elective interest was not in ex-
cess of homestead allowance, but if one-third 
exceeded the homestead, he could only devise 
from his widow two-thirds of his realty In re 
Mower's Estate, 93 Utah 390, 73 P 2d 967 
(1937), holding statutory amendment rendered 
inoperable rule in In re Schenk's Estate, 53 
Utah 381,178 P 344 (1919) (widow renouncing 
will could claim distributive one third share, 
but not homestead) 
Right to homestead. 
Homestead belonged to heirs to whom it was 
set apart, and heirs who were of age at time of 
death of intestate or at time homestead was set 
apart had no interest therein Christiansen v 
Robinson, 35 Utah 67, 99 P 458 (1909) 
Where real estate was set apart as home-
stead to surviving wife of husband and minor 
children, it became theirs absolutely, subject 
only to valid hens or mortgages, fact that value 
of property thereafter exceeded limit of statu-
tory homestead exemption would not authorize 
reopening of estate In re Bedford's Estate, 34 
Utah 24, 95 P 518, 16 L R A (n s ) 728, 16 
Ann Cas 118 (1908) 
Upon death of husband or wife, surviving 
spouse, by operation of law, was vested with 
right of occupancy and use of homestead, and 
this right continued until otherwise directed 
by court, even though survivor remarried In re 
Hansen's Estate, 55 Utah 23, 184 P 197 
(1919) 
REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 40 Am Ju r 2d Homstead 
§ 3 
C.J .S. — 40 C J S Homesteads § 166 
A.L.R. — Previous judgment or agreement 
for their support, statutory family allowance to 
75-2-402 UNIFORM PROBATE CODE 
minor children as affected by, 6 A L R 3d 1387 
Waiver of right to widow's allowance by post-
nuptial agreement, 9 A L R 3d 1319 
Illegitimate child, eligibility to receive fam-
ily allowance out of estate of his deceased fa-
ther, 12 A L R 3 d 1140 
Key Numbers. — Homestead &= 134 
75-2-402. Exempt property — Amount. 
In addition to the homestead allowance, the surviving spouse of a decedent 
who was domiciled in this state is entitled from the estate to value not exceed-
ing $5,000 in excess of any security interests therein m household furniture, 
automobiles, furnishings, appliances, and personal effects. If there is no sur-
viving spouse, children of the decedent are entitled jointly to the same value. 
If encumbered chattels are selected and if the value m excess of security 
interests, plus that of other exempt property, is less than $5,000, or if there is 
not $5,000 worth of exempt property in the estate, the spouse or children are 
entitled to other assets of the estate, if any, to the extent necessary to make up 
the $5,000 value. Rights to exempt property and assets needed to make up a 
deficiency of exempt property have priority over all claims against the estate, 
except reasonable funeral expenses, and the right to any assets to make up a 
deficiency of exempt property shall abate as necessary to permit prior pay-
ment of the reasonable funeral expenses, homestead allowance, and family 
allowance. These rights are in addition to any benefit or share passing to the 
surviving spouse or children by intestate succession, but is chargeable against 
any share passing by the will of the decedent unless the will provides other-
History: C. 1953, 75-2-402, enacted by L. 
1975, ch. 150, § 3; 1988, ch. 110, § 4. 
Editorial Board Comment. — Unlike the 
exempt values described in §§ 75-2-401 and 
75-2-403, the exempt values described in this 
section are available in a case where the dece-
dent left no spouse but left only adult children 
The possible difference between beneficiaries 
of the exemptions described by §§ 75-2-401 
and 75-2-403, and this section, explain the pro-
vision in this section which establishes priori-
ties 
Section 75-2-204 covers waiver of exempt 
property rights, and § 75-2-206 covers the 
question of whether a decedent's will may put 
a spouse to an election with reference to ex-
emptions 
Cross-References. — Effect of divorce, an-
nulment and decree of separation, § 75-2-803 
Waiver of rights by surviving spouse, 
§ 75-2-204 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Insufficiency of estate 
—Multiple-party accounts 
Insufficiency of estate. 
—Multiple-party accounts . 
It was error for the probate court to deny the 
widow her exempt property claim from multi-
ple-party accounts in the name of the dece-
dent's daughter where the estate was insuffi-
cient to satisfy the claim In re Estate of 
Wagley, 760 P 2d 316 (Utah 1988) 
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COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 31 Am J u r 2d Executors Key Numbers. — Executors and Adminis-
and Administrators §§ 496, 762 trators <s= 173 to 201 
C. J . S . — 34 C J S Executors and Adminis-
trators §§ 323 to 366 
(1) In addition to the right to homestead allowance and exempt property, if 
the decedent was domiciled m this state, the surviving spouse and minor 
children whom the decedent was obligated to support and children who were 
in fact being supported by him are entitled to a reasonable allowance in 
money out of the estate for their maintenance during the period of administra-
tion. The allowance may date from the death of the decedent but may not 
continue for longer than one year if the estate is inadequate to discharge 
allowed claims. The allowance may be paid as a lump sum or in periodic 
installments. It is payable to the surviving spouse, if living, for the use of the 
surviving spouse and minor and dependent children; otherwise to the chil-
dren, or persons having their care and custody; but in case any minor child or 
dependent child is not living with the surviving spouse, the allowance may be 
made partially to the child or his guardian or other person having his care and 
custody, and partially to the spouse, as their needs may appear. The family 
allowance is exempt from and has priority over all claims but not over reason-
able funeral expenses and the homestead allowance. 
(2) The family allowance is not chargeable against any benefit or share 
passing to the surviving spouse or children by the will of the decedent unless 
otherwise provided, by intestate succession, or by way of elective share. The 
death of any person entitled to family allowance terminates his right to allow-
ances not yet paid. 
75-2-403. Family allowance. 
History: C. 1953, 75-2-403, enacted by L. 
1975, ch. 150, § 3. 
Editorial Board Comment. — The allow-
ance provided by this section does not qualify 
for the marital deduction under the Federal 
Estate Tax Act [26 U S C § 2001 et seq ] be-
cause the interest is terminable A broad code 
must provide the best possible protection for 
the family m all cases, even though this may 
not provide desired tax advantages for certain 
larger estates In estates falling in the federal 
estate tax bracket where careful planning may 
be expected, it is important to the operation of 
formula clauses that the family allowance be 
clearly terminable or clearly nontermmable 
With the proposed section clearly creating a 
terminable interest, estate planners can create 
a plan which will operate with certainty 
Finally, in order to facilitate administration of 
this allowance without court supervision it is 
necessary to provide a fairly simple and defi-
nite framework 
In determining the amount of the family al-
lowance, account should be taken of both the 
previous standard of living and the nature of 
other resources available to the family to meet 
current living expenses until the estate can be 
administered and assets distributed While the 
death of the principal income producer may ne-
cessitate some change in the standard of living, 
there must also be a period of adjustment If 
the surviving spouse has a substantial income, 
this may be taken into account Whether life 
insurance proceeds payable in a lump sum or 
periodic installments were intended by the de-
cedent to be used for the period of adjustment 
or to be conserved as capital may be consid-
ered A living trust may provide the needed 
income without resorting to the probate estate 
If a husband has been the principal source of 
family support, a wife should not be expected 
to use her capital to support the family 
Obviously, need is relative to the circum-
stances, and what is reasonable must be de-
cided on the basis of the facts of each individ-
ual case Note, however, that under the next 
section the personal representative may not 
determine an allowance of more than [a total 
of $6,0001, a court order would be necessary if a 
greater allowance is reasonably necessary. 
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NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Amount of allowance 
Disclosing personal wealth 
Discontinuance of allowance 
Forfeiture of allowance 
Inheritance tax 
Right to allowance 
Amount of allowance. 
In fixing the amount of the allowance for 
support during administration, the age of the 
survivor or survivors, their health, social posi-
tion, and standing, the education of the chil 
dren, the value of the estate, its solvency or 
insolvency, and value and nature of the 
widow's own separate property were to be con-
sidered In re Pugsley's Estate, 27 Utah 489, 76 
P 560 (1904), In re Bundy's Estate, 121 Utah 
299, 241 P 2 d 462 (1952) 
Disclosing personal wealth. 
In filing petition for family allowance, widow 
and administratrix was to fully disclose her 
personal wealth In re Bundy's Estate, 121 
Utah 299, 241 P 2d 462 (1952) 
Discontinuance of allowance. 
Where there was a prolonged administration 
which appeared to have diluted the estate 
through a family allowance and where there 
was no evident necessity for such prolongation, 
the allowance should not have been continued 
In re Bundy's Estate, 121 Utah 299, 241 P 2d 
462 (1952) 
Forfeiture of allowance. 
Wife who had for many years before death of 
husband lived, pursuant to agreement, sepa-
rate and apart from him, and was not depen-
dent on him for support, was not entitled to 
family allowance on his death under former 
statute In re Park's Estate, 25 Utah 161, 69 P 
671 (1902) 
Under former statute, widow did not forfeit 
her allowance where evidence showed she was 
not voluntarily living separate and apart from 
husband In re Beason's Estate, 49 Utah 24, 
161 P 678 (1916) 
Inheritance tax. 
On appeal from order excluding family al-
lowance in fixing amount of inheritance tax, 
Supreme Court could not consider propriety of 
amount allowed In re Green's Estate, 78 Utah 
139, 1 P 2d 968 (1931) 
Right to allowance 
Provisions in former Probate Code that court 
could exclude persons with separate property 
or income from the family allowance altered 
rule of In re Pugsley's estate, 27 Utah 489, 76 
p 560 (1904), the family allowance was no lon-
ger an absolute right and court could consider 
the extent and nature of the claimant's prop-
erty m determining the amount of, or in deny-
ing, the allowance In re Bundy's Estate, 121 
U t a h 299, 241 P 2d 462 (1952) 
75-2-404. Source, determination, and documentation. 
If the estate is otherwise sufficient, property specifically devised is not used 
to satisfy rights to homestead and exempt property Subject to this restriction, 
the surviving spouse, the guardians of the minor children, or children who are 
adults may select property of the estate as homestead allowance and exempt 
property The personal representative may make these selections if the sur-
viving spouse, the children or the guardians of the minor children are unable 
or fail to do so within a reasonable t ime or if there are no guardians of the 
minor children The personal representative may execute an instrument or 
deed of distribution to establish the ownership of property taken as homestead 
allowance or exempt property He may determine the family allowance and 
may disburse funds of the estate in payment of the family allowance in a lump 
sum or periodic installments, or a combination, but not exceeding the total 
sum of $6,000 The personal representative or any interested person aggrieved 
by any selection, determination, payment , proposed payment, or failure to act 
under this section may petition the court for appropriate relief, which relief 
may provide a family allowance larger or smaller than that which the per-
sonal representative determined or could have determined 
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History: C. 1953, 75-2-404, enacted by L. 
1975, ch. 150, § 3; 1979, ch. 245, § 1. 
Editorial Board Comment. — See 
§§ 75 3 902, 75-3-906 and 75 3 907 
History: C. 1953, 75-2-501, enacted by L. 
1975, ch. 150, § 3. 
Editorial Board Comment — This section 
states a uniform minimum age of eighteen for 
capacity to execute a will 'Minor" is defined m 
§ 75-1 201, and may involve a different age 
than that prescribed here 
ANALYSIS 
Burden of proof 
County as devisee 
Disinheritance 
Expert and opinion evidence 
Legislative control 
Limitations on testamentary capacity of mar-
ried men 
Mental competency 
Old age 
Testamentary capacity 
Burden of proof. 
Burden of proof was on contestant to show 
mental incapacity and undue influence, the 
Cross-References . — Distribution in kind, 
§§ 75-3 906, 75-3 907 
Distribution, order in which assets distrib-
uted, abatement, § 75-3-902 
Cross-References. — Custody and deposit 
of wills, § 75-2 901 
Dower and curtesy abolished, § 75 2-113 
Right of married woman to take by will and 
make a will, Utah Const, Art XXII, Sec 2, 
§ 30 2 1 
proponent of will could meet that by proof of a 
negative, that is, that he did not procure the 
execution of the will by undue influence, and 
testator was not mentally incapable In re 
Bryan's Estate, 82 Utah 390, 25 P 2d 602 
(1933) 
County as devisee. 
Testamentary disposition to county hospital 
could be taken by the county as a corporation 
Manatakis ' Estate v Walker Bank & Trust 
Co , 5 Utah 2d 412, 303 P 2d 701 (1956) 
Disinheritance. 
Testator was acting wholly within his rights 
in bequeathing the bulk of his property and 
PART 5 
WILLS 
Editorial Board Comment. — Part 5 of Chapter 2 deals with capacity and formalities for 
execution and revocation of wills If the will is to be restored to its role as the major instrument 
for disposition of wealth at death, its execution must be kept simple The basic intent of these 
sections is to validate the will whenever possible To this end, the age for making wills is lowered 
to eighteen, formalities for a written and attested will are kept to a minimum, holographic wills 
written and signed by the testator are authorized, choice of law as to validity of execution is 
broadened, and revocation by operation of law is limited to divorce or annulment However, the 
statute also provides for a more formal method of execution with acknowledgement before a 
public officer (the self proved will) 
These family protection provisions supply the basis for the important small estate provisions of 
Chapter 3, Part 12 
States adopting the Code may see fit to alter the dollar amounts suggested in these sections or 
vary the terms and conditions in other ways so as to accommodate existing traditions Although 
creditors of estates would be aided somewhat if all family exemption provisions relating to pro-
bate estates were the same throughout the country there is relatively less need for uniformity of 
law regarding these provisions than is true of any of the other parts of this article Still, it is quite 
important for all states to limit their homestead, allowance and exempt property provisions, if 
any, so that they apply only to estates of decedents who were domicihanes of the state 
Notice that § 75-2 104 imposes a requirement of survival of the decedent for 120 hours on any 
spouse or child claiming under this part 
75-2-501. Who may make a will. 
Any person 18 or more years of age who is of sound mind may make a will 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
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(4) In satisfying a share provided by Subsection (l)(a), devises made by the 
will abate under Section 75-3-902. 
History: C. 1953, 75-2-302, enacted by L. last amended by Laws 1988, ch 110, § 2, 
1998, ch. 39, § 38. relating to pretermitted children m a will, and 
Repeals and Reenactments . — Laws enacts the present section, effective July 1, 
1998, ch 39, § 38 repeals former § 75-2-302, as 1998 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Cited in In re Estate of Jones, 858 P2d 983 
(Utah 1993) 
PART 4 
EXEMPT PROPERTY AND ALLOWANCES 
75-2-401. Exempt property and allowances — Applicable 
law. 
This part applies to the estate of a decedent who dies domiciled in Utah. 
Rights to homestead allowance, exempt property, and family allowance for a 
decedent who dies not domiciled in Utah are governed by the law of the 
decedent's domicile at death. 
History: C. 1953, 75-2-401, enacted by L. last amended by Laws 1988, ch 110, § 3, 
1998, ch. 39, § 39. relating to homestead allowance and amount, 
Repeals and Reenactments . — Laws and enacts the present section, effective July 1, 
1998, ch 39, § 39 repeals former § 75-2-401, as 1998 
75-2-402. Homestead allowance. 
A decedent's surviving spouse is entitled to a homestead allowance of 
$15,000. If there is no surviving spouse, each minor child and each dependent 
child of the decedent is entitled to a homestead allowance amounting to 
$15,000 divided by the number of minor and dependent children of the 
decedent. The homestead allowance is exempt from and has priority over all 
claims of the estate. Unless otherwise provided by the will or governing 
instrument, the homestead allowance is chargeable against any benefit or 
share passing to the surviving spouse, minor, or dependent child, by the will of 
the decedent, by intestate succession, by way of elective share, and by way of 
nonprobate transfers as defined in Sections 75-2-205 and 75-2-206. 
History: C. 1953, 75-2-402, enacted by L. last amended by Laws 1988, ch 110, § 4, 
1998, ch. 39, § 40. relating to exempt property amount, and en-
Repeals and Reenactments . — Laws acts the present section, effective July 1, 1998 
1998, ch 39, § 40 repeals former § 75-2-402, as 
75-2-403. Exempt property. 
In addition to the homestead allowance, the decedent's surviving spouse is 
entitled from the estate to a value, not exceeding $10,000 in excess of any 
security interests therein, in household furniture, automobiles, furnishings, 
appliances, and personal effects. If there is no surviving spouse, the decedent's 
children are entitled jointly to the same value. If encumbered chattels are 
selected and the value in excess of security interests, plus that of other exempt 
**
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property, is less than $10,000, or if there is not $10,000 worth of ex 
property in the estate, the spouse or children are entitled to other assets c 
estate, if any, to the extent necessary to make up the $10,000 value Ri^r 
exempt property and assets needed to makeup a deficiency of exempt proi 
have priority over all claims against the estate, but the right to any asse 
make up a deficiency of exempt property abates as necessary to permit eg 
payment of homestead allowance and family allowance Unless othe° 
provided by the will or governing instrument, the exempt property all 
is chargeable against any benefit or share passing to the surviving
 Spou 
any, or if there is no surviving spouse, to the decedent's children, by the w 
the decedent, by intestate succession, by way of elective share, and by
 w 
nonprobate transfers as defined in Sections 75-2-205 and 75-2-206. 
History: C. 1953, 75-2-403, enacted by L. enacted by Laws 1975, ch 150, § 3, relal 
1998, ch. 39, § 41. family allowance, and enacts the presei 
Repeals and Reenactments. — Laws tion, effective July 1, 1998 
1998, ch 39, § 41 repeals former § 75-2-403, as 
75-2-404, Family allowance. 
(1) In addition to the right to homestead allowance and exempt propert: 
decedent's surviving spouse and minor children whom the decedent 
obligated to support and children who were in fact being supported b} 
decedent are entitled to a reasonable allowance in money out of the estat 
their maintenance during the period of administration, which allowance 
not continue for longer than one year if the estate is inadequate to discb 
allowed claims. The allowance may be paid as a lump sum or in per 
installments. It is payable to the surviving spouse, if living, for the use o 
surviving spouse and minor and dependent children; otherwise to the chile 
or persons having their care and custody. If a minor child or dependent ch 
not living with the surviving spouse, the allowance may be made partial 
the child or his guardian or other person having the child's care and cus 
and partially to the spouse, as their needs may appear. The family allow 
is exempt from and has priority over all claims except the homes 
allowance. 
(2) Unless otherwise provided by the will or governing instrument, 
family allowance is chargeable against any benefit or share passing to 
surviving spouse or minor children, by the will of the decedent, by intes 
succession, by way of elective share, and by way of nonprobate transfei 
defined in Sections 75-2-205 and 75-2-206. The death of any person entith 
family allowance terminates the right to allowances not yet paid. 
History: C. 1953, 75-2-404, enacted by L. last amended by Laws 1979, ch 245, 
1998, ch. 39, § 42. relating to source, determination, and 
Repeals and Reenactments. — Laws mentation of estate, and enacts the pr 
1998, ch 39, § 42 repeals former § 75-2-404, as section, effective July 1, 1998 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Amount of allowance. viving spouse's previous s tandard of hvinj 
The factors to be used in determining the value of the estate, and the value and nati 
amount of the family allowance during admin- the surviving spouse's own separate pro] 
istration include the age of the surviving Hamilton v Hamilton, 869 P2d 971 (Uta 
spouse, the surviving spouse's health, the sur- App ), cert denied, 879 P2d 266 (Utah 15 
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75-2-405. Source, determination, and documentation. 
(1) If the estate is otherwise sufficient, property specifically devised may not 
be used to satisfy rights to homestead allowance or exempt property. Subject to 
this restriction, the surviving spouse, guardians of minor children, or children 
who are adults may select property of the estate as homestead allowance and 
exempt property. The personal representative may make those selections if the 
surviving spouse, the children, or the guardians of the minor children are 
unable or fail to do so within a reasonable time or there is no guardian of a 
minor child. The personal representative may execute an instrument or deed 
of distribution to establish the ownership of property taken as homestead 
allowance or exempt property The personal representative may determine the 
family allowance in a lump sum not exceeding $18,000 or periodic installments 
not exceeding $1,500 per month for one year, and may disburse funds of the 
estate in payment of the family allowance and any part of the homestead 
allowance payable in cash. The personal representative or an interested person 
aggrieved by any selection, determination, payment, proposed payment, or 
failure to act under this section may petition the court for appropriate relief, 
which may include a family allowance other than that which the personal 
representative determined or could have determined. 
(2) If the right to an elective share is exercised on behalf of a surviving 
spouse who is an incapacitated person, the personal representative may add 
any unexpended portions payable under the homestead allowance, exempt 
property, and family allowance to the trust established under Subsection 
75-2-212(2). 
History: C. 1953, 75-2-405, enacted by L. Effective Dates. — Laws 1998, ch 39, § 105 
1998, ch. 39, § 43. makes the act effective on July 1, 1998. 
PART 5 
WILLS 
75-2-501. Who may make will. 
An individual 18 or more years of age who is of sound mind may make a will. 
History: C. 1953, 75-2-501, enacted by L. enacted by Laws 1975, ch. 150, § 3, relating to 
1998, ch. 39, § 44. who may make a will, and enacts the present 
Repeals and Reenactments . — Laws section, effective July 1, 1998. 
1998, ch 39, § 44 repeals former § 75-2-501, as 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Testamentary capacity. mentary capacity and left the proponent of the 
A Veteran's Administration incompetency will with the burden to show, by a simple 
rating, and resulting conservatorships and preponderance of the evidence, that decedent 
guardianship, did not create a presumption of had the requisite mental capacity to make a 
decedent's incapacity to make a will; however, valid will Montes Family v. Carter, 878 P.2d 
such indicia of diminished mental capacity did, H68 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) 
at least, neutralize the presumption of testa-
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COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
A.L.R. — Alzheimer's disease as affecting 
testamentary capacity, 47 A L R 5th 523 
75-2-502. Execution — Witnessed wills — Holographic 
wills. 
(1) Except as provided in Subsection (2) and in Sections 75-2-503, 75-2-506 
and 75-2-513, a will shall be: 
(a) in writing; 
(b) signed by the testator or in the testator's name by some othe 
individual in the testator's conscious presence and by the testator' 
direction; and 
(c) signed by at least two individuals, each of whom signed within 
reasonable time after he witnessed either the signing of the will a 
described in Subsection (l)(b) or the testator's acknowledgment of the 
signature or acknowledgment of the will. 
(2) A will that does not comply with Subsection (1) is valid as a holograph] 
will, whether or not witnessed, if the signature and material portions of tb 
document are in the testator's handwriting. 
(3) Intent that the document constitutes the testator's will can be estal 
lished by extrinsic evidence, including, for holographic wills, portions of tb 
document that are not in the testator's handwriting. 
History: C. 1953, 75-2-502, enacted by L. enacted by Laws 1975, ch 150, § 3, relating 
1998, ch. 39, § 45. execution of a will, and enacts the prese 
Repeals and Reenactments . — Laws section, effective July 1, 1998. 
1998, ch 39, § 45 repeals former § 75-2-502, as 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Holographic wills . 2-513, as the document met the requirements 
a holographic will under former section § 75 
—Holographic codicil.
 5 0 3 a n d therefore could have been a codicil 
Trial court erred in ruling that a handwritten
 t h e t e s t a t o r ' s w l U l f l t w a s s h o W n to have be 
document signed by the testator which directed
 w n t t e n a f t e r t h e w l U I n r e E s t a t e o f Klemim 
the disposition of personal property, including
 g 7 Q p 2 d 1 2g6 (Utah 1998). 
money, was a memorandum under former § 75-
75-2-503. Writings intended as wills. 
Although a document or writing added upon a document was not executed 
compliance with Section 75-2-502, the document or writing is treated as ii 
had been executed in compliance with that section if the proponent of t 
document or writing establishes by clear and convincing evidence that i 
decedent intended the document or writing to constitute: 
(1) the decedent's will; 
(2) a partial or complete revocation of the will; 
(3) an addition to or an alteration of the will; or 
(4) a partial or complete revival of his formerly revoked will or o 
formerly revoked portion of the will. 
History: C. 1953, 75-2-503, enacted by L. last amended by Laws 1977, ch 194, § 
1998, ch. 39, <> 46. relating to holographic wil s, and enacts 
Repeals and Reenactments. — Laws present section, effective July 1, lyyo. 
1998, ch 39, § 46 repeals former § 75-2-503, as 
